Symposium - AIC

Philip Krinks
III: PAUSANIAS AND PRAXIS
III.1 Pausanias and his predecessors
Pausanias criticises the method so far:
‘Far from fine is the manner, Phaedrus, it seems to me, that the topic (logos) has been imposed
(probeblēsthai) on us - I mean, that we have been instructed to praise erōs too simply (haplōs).’
(180c4-5)
Pausanias finds a single, but important fault: the logos has been ‘imposed’ 6 , qua topic and qua
method, ‘too simply’ (haplōs). 7 In terms of the famous exchange in Euripides’ Phoenician Women 8 ,
Pausanias casts Phaedrus as Polyneices, who thought nostalgically that simplicity was the mark of
truth, and that complexity was inappropriately sophistical (as opposed to appropriately subtle and
nuanced 9 ). Pausanias casts himself, on the other hand, as Eteocles, to whom what is simple (haplous)
may be unhelpful, because it can constrain appropriately two-sided debate.
Pausanias’ account of erōs is as multiple:
‘If erōs were one, then that [sc. imposing a haplōs method] would be fine, but in fact he is not one’
(180c5-6)
A simple method is literally too one-fold, in assuming that erōs is one. Perhaps Pausanias assumes
that it will not work to praise in a simple way a thing which is not simple: after all, poetry referred to
erōtes plural. Perhaps Pausanias is more subtle: a method which is not simple reveals an erōs which is
not one.
III.2 Pausanias’ focus: the praxis of erōs
For Pausanias, as 180c7-d3 shows, not only is erōs multiple, but one of the erōtes is not in fact
praiseworthy. Phaedrus assumed he had to praise all erōs. If in fact one or more kinds of erōs can be
left unpraised, how is one to identify the kind of erōs which is praiseworthy? Methodologically,
Pausanias’ frame is that each erōs is a practical activity (praxis). His principle is that any praxis can be
praiseworthy or not:
‘The following holds true of every practical activity (praxis): being done, itself by itself, it is neither
fine nor shameful. But within the doing of it (en tēi praxei), depending on the manner in which it is
done (hōs an prachtei), so it turns out.’ (181a1-4)
Whereas on Phaedrus’ heroic view, every activity was either fine or shameful, Pausanias implies no
6 I would bring out the notion of imposition a little more than the translators. (E.g.: Jowett 1970: ‘The argument has not been
set before us quite in the right form.’ Rowe 1998: ‘Our subject seems not to have been put forward in the right way.’ Gill
2003: ‘Our project has [not] been specified properly’.) The expression prosballein ti tini literally means ‘to throw something
against someone’. Cf. Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 950f., where Hermes asks ‘do not impose (prosbalēis) upon me a
double (diplas) journey’ –Pausanias’ concern at the imposition of a single method may recall Hermes’ concern at the
possible imposition of a double journey
7 The adjective ‘haplous’ from which the adverb ‘haplōs’ word comes, means, literally, ‘in a single way’ ‘one-fold’, ‘single’.
It is contrasted with double or two-fold (diplous). Since it is a complaint, it must in the context have the connotation of ‘too
simple’, ‘simplistic’, or ‘simple-minded’. But it can also have a positive connotation: simple, clear, decisive, plain, open,
straightforward, frank
8 Produced 409 B.C.
Polyneices: ‘Simple (haplous) is the word of truth
And of complex (poikilōn) interpretations justice has no need
Since it of itself has the advantage. But the unjust word
Diseased in itself needs drugs which are clever (sophōn)…’ (Lines 469-72)
Eteocles: ‘…But if the same thing seemed to all fine (kalon) and wise (sophon)
There wouldn’t be the two-sided strife of debate among humans
But nothing is like nor equal (ison) among mortals
Except names (onomosai); and names are not deeds (ergon)…’ (lines 499-502)
(I owe my understanding of the importance of these lines to Meltzer 2006, pp.1ff, whose translation (p.2 ibid.) I adapt here)
9 The word for this might be poikilon cf. Medea line 300, ‘those with a reputation for subtlety’ and cp. Apology 20d-23c,
esp. 21b-22; cp. Williamson 1990 p.30 n.12
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