Symposium - AIC

Jens Kristian Larsen
philotimia, whereas the third part, 9 running from 209e5-212c3, finally, elaborates the effects of eros
from the perspective of philosophia. Here I will limit myself to say a few words about the second and
third parts, in particular about the relation between philotimia and philosophia we find therein. 10
In both the second and the third part of Diotima’s speech we find a hierarchy of types of eros.
These hierarchies are dependent on Diotima’s claim that eros, as desire for something, must be
understood as broader than the erotic relation between human beings (205b4-c10): eros is, generally
speaking, our desire to possess the good in order to become happy, a desire characterizing all human
beings (204e1-205a8). But although all people naturally desire to possess the good, in order to
become happy, different people regard different things as what is truly good. To illustrate this point,
Diotima initially lists three types of desires, three kinds of eros, in addition to what is normally called
love, namely a love of money-making, a love of gymnastics and a love of wisdom (205d4-5) that
roughly seem to correspond to the three kinds of desires Socrates ascribed to the three parts of the
soul in the Republic, that is the epithymic, the thymoedic and the rational parts (553c, 549a, 581b). 11
Diotima then delivers two hierarchies of types of desire, one at the end of the second part of her
speech, that is at 208e1-209a9, the other at the beginning of the third part, running from 210a4 to
210e2. Both hierarchies begin by contrasting the types of desires to be placed within them with
physical erotic desire, which in the Republic is determined as one of the characteristic desires of the
epithymic part. As I see it, the first hierarchy is centred entirely on philotimia, which may be said to
be the kind of eros which corresponds to the desire of what is in the Republic called the thymoeidic
part, whereas the second culminates in the eros which corresponds to the leading desire of that part of
the soul which in the Republic is called to logistikon.
Prior to the first hierarchy, Diotima explains that the real motivation behind deeds performed
as an expression of philotimia is a love of immortality, since immortality can supposedly be gained –
so far as this is humanly possible - through an eternal renown for one’s virtue (208c1-e1). This
motivation results in different psychic products, such as speeches about virtue (209b8), poetry (209a4-
5, 209c7-d4) and lawgiving (209a6-8, 209d4-e4), which are supposedly the offspring of the virtues
possessed by their creators. The third hierarchy, in contrast, regards this kind of striving for
immortality as just a preliminary to philosophy (210a1-2, 210e5-6), which is the true striving for
immortality, and here science (epistêmê, 210c6-d6) and the vision of true beauty is added to the list as
higher kinds of eros.
A full discussion of how these two hierarchies relate to each other lies beyond the scope of the
present paper. Here I only wish to emphasize the following. The first hierarchy explicates different
ways in which people seek eternal renown through psychic products that bear witness to their virtue,
and this explains how philotimia drives people towards virtue, in a manner that closely resembles
Phaedrus’ initial claim that philotimia leads us to imitate what is by nature best. 12 In contrast to
Phaedrus, however, Diotima indicates that such activities have a further goal than virtue, namely
eternal renown. 13 To people driven by philotimia, Diotima suggests, virtue is regarded as a means to
an end, honour and renown, rather than as an end in itself. 14 In contrast, the second hierarchy makes
clear that, in order to gain true virtue, and not just images (eidôla) of virtues (212a3-5), one must
proceed from the love of bodies, of beautiful ways of living, and of the sciences, to a single science,
namely the science about the beautiful (210d6-e1). It is only when one reaches this level of
knowledge that one becomes virtuous and life becomes worth living (211d1-2). The second hierarchy
thus makes clear that the virtues attested to by the deeds performed through philotimia are not true
virtues.
It is tempting to see a parallel between this and what Socrates claims in the Phaedo and the
Republic, namely that political or popular virtue, the kind of virtue pursued by most gentlemen, is in
fact not true virtue, because it is not grounded in knowledge or wisdom (phrônesis) which in turn
9 There is a clear shift in Diotima’s speech at 209e5 which on the dramatic level is emphasized by the fact that Diotima,
through the voice of Socrates, states that Socrates may no longer be able to follow her. As many commentators have pointed
out, this shift is structured around the division between the lesser and the greater mysteries known from ??
10 For a more elaborate discussion of how these relate, see Sheffield, op. Cit., 137-153
11 See Francisco Lisi, ”Philosophische und tyrannische Liebe” in Plato’s Symposium – Proceedings of the fifth Symposim
Platonicum Pragense, ed. A. Havlíček and M. Cajthaml. Prague, 2005, 182-183. See also Strauss, op. cit., 57. In contrast to
Lisi I believe that the discussion of philotimia is not limited to the passage 208c1-e1 but continues till 209e4. For a similar
reading, see Dorothe Frede, ”Eros als Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit” in Platon. Symposion – Klassiker Auslegen 39, hg.
Christoph Horn, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012, 151-154.
12 The connection with Phaedrus is emphasized by the fact that Diotima, in order to exemplify the deeds performed through
philotimia, uses the same examples as Phaedrus had done earlier, compare 208d2—6 with 179b4-180b5.
13 I have discussed the relation between Phaedrus’ and Diotima’s speeches at greater length in ”The love of the beloved” in
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013, 81-83.
14 Cf. Frede, op. cit., 151-152.
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