history of soy yogurt, soy acidophilus milk and other ... - SoyInfo Center

students showed similar trends. However in this study animal
welfare and third world issues rather than cost and healthy
diet were the most common reasons for giving up meat.”
884. Lindner, Anders. 1990. Re: Dairylike products made
from soymilk in Europe. Retail outlets for soymilk in
Europe, country by country. Letter (fax) to William Shurtleff
at Soyfoods Center, June 19. 1 p. Handwritten. [Eng]
• Summary: The following fi gures are my guesstimates:
I would estimate that no more than 15% of the soymilk
made in Europe is then made into dairylike products, not
including tofu. Of the soymilk made into dairylike products,
roughly 60% is made into ice creams, 20% into non-frozen
desserts (incl. puddings, and custards), 15% into yogurts, and
5% into non-dairy cheeses.
Of all the soymilk soy in Europe as a beverage, I would
estimate that 50% is sold at health food stores, 40% at
supermarket chains, multiples, and general food stores, and
10% at Asian retail stores.
A wild guess as to the percentage of soymilk sold at
Supermarkets–Health food stores–Asian stores in each
country would look something like this: United Kingdom,
West Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland would all be 40%–50%–10%.
Italy, Scandinavia, Spain, and Others would all be 10%–
80%–10%.
Austria would be 30%–60%–10%. Address: P.O. Box
19002, S-250 09 Helsingborg, Sweden. Phone: 42-92776.
885. McKelvey, Richard. 1990. Tomsun Foods and Jofu: The
rise and fall, recovery under William Holmes, then current
demise (Interview). SoyaScan Notes. June 21. Conducted by
William Shurtleff of Soyfoods Center. Followed by written
chronology, 28 Nov. 1990.
• Summary: Richard worked for Tomsun from June 1984
until Jan. 1990. He started working part time doing taste
testing and consumer research on Jofu while attending the
Univ. of Massachusetts Business School. In June 1985 he
was hired full time as sales manager for Tomsun’s tofu and
Oriental products. Dave Scarbo, formerly with Dannon, was
sales manager for Jofu.
In 1979 Juan Metzger of Dannon had contacted Tom
Timmins of New England Soy Dairy (NESD), and in 1982
he joined NESD as chairman of the board. Also in 1982 the
company’s name was changed to Tomsun Foods, Inc. But
it was not until 1983 that the idea of Jofu was born. That
year NESD had sales of $1.8 million (up from $700,000 in
1980) and 34 employees. In Dec. 1983 Inc. magazine named
Tomsun one of the fastest growing private companies in
America. By mid-1985 the Jofu package design and formula
were ready. In Dec. 1985 Jofu was launched in New England
test market. From Jan. to March 1986 Jofu was distributed
into western Massachusetts supermarkets and Wegmans
supermarkets in Rochester, New York. Tomsun began a
HISTORY OF SOY YOGURT & CULTURED SOYMILK 330
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media campaign with 10 weeks of radio and free standing
inserts (FSIs) featuring the slogan “It’s time to go beyond
yogurt.” In May 1986 Jofu was introduced into health food
distribution. At that time, Jofu was sweetened with high
fructose corn syrup. About 6 months later, the corn syrup was
discontinued; honey was used as a sweetener for the health
food market and sugar for the mass market. Also in May
1986 Tomsun launched a massive public relations campaign.
Articles appeared in highly visible such as the Wall Street
Journal and Advertising Age. Richard is not sure when the
sugar sweetened and when the honey sweetened fl avors were
introduced. In Dec. 1986 Tomsun’s fi rst public stock offering
[which netted $3.46 million] raised the necessary funds to
promote the product. During 1986, Tomsun had sales of $2.5
million and 65 employees. Shortly after the stock offering,
Tomsun’s sales force was restructured to have 3 regional
managers instead of product managers. The managers were
much more interested in Jofu than in tofu. Richard became
regional manager for New England.
In the spring of 1987 Jofu was introduced, at great
expense, to metropolitan New York and New Jersey. During
1987 Tomsun spent nearly $1 million on a radio, newspaper,
and public relations campaign (including slotting allowances
and some coupons in papers) in the New York metropolitan,
New England, and Albany (NY) markets. The goal was to
get Jofu into supermarkets. The promotional program was
well executed and cost effective; orders fl owed in. Though
sales rose in 1987 to $3.6 million, the company lost more
than $2 million that year. Big problems had started. Tomsun
began to receive many more orders than it was able to fi ll.
There were ongoing product shortages and problems with
product quality and consistency–which hurt. Shelf life was
not a big problem. It started at 40 days and now is about 90
days.
With so much attention focused on Jofu, Tomsun did not
give enough attention to its traditional money making lines,
especially tofu and pasta. Nasoya seized the opportunity and
began to offer heavy competition to Tomsun’s tofu products.
Nasoya came in with lower prices and aggressive marketing.
Nasoya’s pitch was that Tomsun doesn’t care about tofu any
more; they are “beyond tofu” into this new dairylike product
for the dairy case. Produce buyers began to lose confi dence
in Tomsun, which was slow to react. Nasoya’s tofu was
soon replacing Tomsun’s in many large accounts where
Tomsun had been the fi rst and only brand for years. So one
of Tomsun’s major sources of income began to drop rapidly.
At the same time the tofu machinery was getting run down,
which led to quality problems and made it easier for Nasoya
to compete.
There were several major causes of the company’s
downfall. The fi rst was overexpansion too quickly. The
company took big risks. It went down to New York and New
Jersey, spent big money on Jofu slotting allowances and PR,
opened an offi ce in New York City and hired a full sales