Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

Bosnian Croats would permit supplies to flow again to the Bosnian government
(including weapons and material for the army) along routes they controlled, and joint
operations could be encouraged between the HVO and government forces.” 367
Bemerkenswerterweise bedienen sich die Amerikaner bei der Lieferung der Waffen
des ehemaligen „Todfeindes“ Iran als Partner bedienen. Die benötigte Infrastruktur,
um ihr Vorhaben sicher zu stellen, installieren sich Amerikaner in Kroatien vorerst gut
getarnt selbst. “Following the Washington accords, the Croatian government agreed
to lease part of the Adriatic island of Brac to the U.S. military, which stablished an
intelligence-gathering center there.” 368 Gleichzeitig beginnen amerikanische
Militärberater von einem als Feldlazarett deklarierten Zentrum auf dem Flughafen
von Zagreb, verdeckt für die kroatische Armee zu arbeiten. 369
US-Unterstaatssekretär Peter Tarnoff äußert sich nach Kriegsende zur weiteren
Entwicklung diplomatisch-verklausuliert: “In April 1994, we were asked by the
Government of Croatia whether the U.S. would object if Croatia were to allow arms
shipments to the Bosnian Government from other countries, including Iran, to transit
Croatian territory. Given the military urgency of the situation facing the Federation on
the ground and the imbalance in favor of the Bosnian Serb forces, the Administration
did not object to possible arms shipments to the Bosnians through Croatia. We
decided that we should neither approve or nor object to such shipments; U.S.
representatives were told to respond to further inquiries by the Croatian Government
by stating they had ‘no instructions’ on the matter. The U.S. has no contact with the
Government of Iran on this matter. Beginning in May 1994, the U.S. intellingence
community began to report flights by Iranian transport planes to Croatia with cargoes
intended for Bosnia and which were believed to contain military as well as
humanitarian supplies. These reports were contained in an intelligence document
that is provided on a daily basis to the relevant Congressional commitee; the
Leadership and its staff had access to this daily...“ 370 Mit einem Wort, die Amerikaner
sagen offiziell, man habe keine Kontakte mit den Iranern bei den Waffenlieferungen
für die Moslems, andererseits wissen sie von den entsprechenden „Paketen“, die die
Moslems erhalten und tolerieren dies wohlwollend. Aber ganz so wie US-
Unterstaatssekretär Peter Tarnoff es glauben machen will - nämlich ohne
367
Woodward, Balkan tragedy. S. 315
368
Glenny, Heading off war. In: Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995. S. 101 - 102
369
Rathfelder, Sarajevo und danach. S. 200
370
Statement of Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, House International
Relations Commitee, April 23, 1996. In: U.S. Government (Hg.), U.S. policy towards Bosnia. Hearing
before the Commitee on International Relations House of Representatives one hundred fourth
Congress second session, April 23, 1996. S. 43
112