Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

shells, and when all was securely bolted to pallets with parachutes attached, the
pilots would set a course for the Croatian coast and onwards into Bosnia. In the
event that they could not complete their missions in one run Brac Island, just off the
coast from Split, could be used as a staging post; and some of the local people in the
island’s picturesque town of Bol were adamant that American C-130s were flying in
and out of their airport on a regular basis. When the delivery runs were made into
Bosnia they were most probably coordinated by US Special Forces personnel on the
ground the presence of whom, despite complete denial by the Untied States, was
verified by Canadian UN troops in Visoko during January 1995 and accepted as a
fact by the Intelligence Section at UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb. US special
forces personnel were also operating openly in Tuzla where Major Guy Sands made
no attempt to disguise either his presence or his activities. At Split airport USAF
Colonel Ray Shepherd had also set up a logistics base and made no secret of the
fact that US personnel scattered throughout the region were operating to specific US
agendas. (...) While admittedly there appeared to be American personnel in one
guise or another scattered all over the Split-Zadar region, and most of them were so
unconcerned at being recognized that they drove around in cars with US licence
plates which they had driven to the Balkans from their bases in German, what the
Monitors had accidentally stumbled upon that night was certainly out of the ordinary.
What made the whole episode even more suspicious was the presence in the airport
building at exactly the same time of Colonel Kresimir Cosic, personal advisor to
President Tudjman and Chairman of the Croatian Defence Ministry’s committee for
‘international co-operation and bi-lateral projects’. Cosic, later to become Lieutenant
General and Croatia’s Deputy Defence Minister, was at that time functioning as
Tudjman’s liaison officer with the US State Department on the activities of MPRI and
the implementation of the US Defence Training and Advisory Programme
(DTAP).“ 382
Die Amerikaner ziehen ihre Strategie jedenfalls so gut es geht allein durch, die
Europäer werden nur in dem Ausmaß informiert, in dem es absolut notwendig ist, um
Schwierigkeiten zu vermeiden. Gleiches gilt für den US-Geheimdienst, wie immer die
Drehscheibe solcher US-Aktivitäten im kriegerischen Ausland. 383 Als die
europäischen US-Verbündeten aber mitbekommen, dass die bosnischen Moslems
382 O’Shea, Crisis at Bihac. S. 159 - 160
383
“The CIA has denied that it is working from the Sarajevo headquarters of the Bosnian government,
but it has not denied that its operatives are on the ground in Bosnia.” Joan Hoey, Policy without
principle; The Nation, January 30 1996. Internet: http://www.suc.org/politics/myth/embargo.htl
116