Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

RS“ in Bosnien natürlich politisch ebenfalls nutzen und sucht nach Erklärungen,
warum er nicht eingreifen hatte lassen beziehungsweise können. Gleichzeitig schiebt
er die Verantwortung für eine neue - willkommene - Vertreibungswelle von Nicht-
Serben aus Banja Luka den Flüchtlingen aus der Krajina zu: “On the situation of
Croats in Banja Luka, Karadzic said it was difficult to control the anger of the Serbian
refugees who had just been expelled form Western Slavonia. They wanted revenge.
He would try to increase the Serbian police presence in Banja Luka, but many of the
Serbian police had been mobilized and were on the front lines. They were
unavailable to maintain law and order. On the Croatian invasion of West Slavonia: ‘It
happened so fast I didn’t have time to send my army.’” 278 Die Aussage, es sei “zu
schnell” passiert, könnte man fast glauben, wüßte man nicht besser, dass die
bosnischen Serben weder über die Intention und schon gar nicht die Mittel zum
militärischen Eingreifen verfügen.
Für die Kroaten ist der Aufruf der Krajina-Führung zur Flucht natürlich ein Segen -
das ist genau das, was man wollte. Als Folge findet man weite Teile des “befreiten”
Gebietes praktisch entvölkert vor, ohne sich um eine mögliche Vertreibung kümmern
zu müssen. “Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this triumphalism was the
complete absence of the people who had been supposedly liberated - there were
absolutely none. As the Croatian army rolled into each town and village with their
clean-up teams right behind them, literally washing the blood off the streets, painting
white lines on the roads, erecting road signs in Latin script and clearing away all war
debris before the international media were allowed into the area, the streets were
empty save for a few elderly people who were either too old or sick to embark on a
journey into exile. (...) Later that evening more video footage was released that
showed prisoners being publicly humiliated as they were forced to strip to their dirty
soiled underwear and then remain standing for questioning by Croatian
Policewomen, who nonchalantly blew cigarette smoke into their faces while admiring
their discomfort. Corralled now into football stadium and gymnasiums at Varazdin,
Bjelovar and Pzega over 1,100 members of the 18th Corps began a period of
contemplation in which they would ask themselves how all of this could possibly have
happened so quickly, and why neither Martic or Karadzic had come to their rescue.
Sector West had fallen to the Croats without any real resistance and had left the
Croatian army buoyant and euphoric.” 279 Offensichtlich wird, dass die bosnischen
Serben, die ihren kroatischen Landsleuten Beistand zugesagt und noch nicht einmal
drei Monate zuvor ein gemeinsames militärisches Oberkommando mit ihnen gebildet
hatten, seit dem Ablauf des Waffenstillstandes in Bosnien-Hercegowina am 30. April
278
Corwin, Dubious Mandate. S. 33
279
O’Shea, Crisis at Bihac. S. 207
88