Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

Ziel: Die Vorbereitung der politischen Vereinigung von “RSK” und der “RS”. Doch
diese Flucht nach vorne braucht Milosevic eben jetzt nicht - und sie wird wenig
später von den realen Ereignissen überrollt und hätte ohnehin keine Zukunft gehabt.
Vielmehr zeigt sich das Meeting in Sanski Most eher als der Anfang vom Ende der
Hegemonialambitionen der bosnisch- und kroatisch-serbischen Eliten denn ein
Highlight des Aufstiegs. 184 Denn in der westbosnischen Kleinstadt bricht vielmehr der
Machtkampf um die RS voll aus.
“It quickly became clear that this was no ordinary meeting when Milan Martic turned
up, accompanied by the leaders of both the Krajina army and church. On the
Bosnian Serb side Karadzic presided over the entire proceedings with General
Mladic also in attendance as indeed were the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox
church. On the outset Karadzic launched into a blistering attack on Mladic for his
failure to hold the line against both the Muslims and Croats in recent weeks, and
some initial reports suggested that Karadzic had actually tried to relieve him of his
command. In reply Mladic attempted to shift the blame to the political authorities for
failing to supply him with much-needed fuel and equipment and proclaimed that the
continuing rift between Belgrade and Pale was the greatest tragedy for all Serbs. He
then delivered a very pessimistic prediction for the future admitting that in his opinion
the BSA (VRS, RD) did not have the capability to achieve an overall military victory,
nor could they count on retaining indefinite control over 70 per cent of Bosnia. At the
end of a very bitter debate Mladic demanded that the politicians establish optional
war goals so that his soldiers would at least know what objectives they were dying
for. This was not well received by the politicians, and for many it looked as if the
ghost of the 49/51 division of Bosnia was now being advocated by their own military
supremo. If that were the case, and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that
Mladic may well have been delivering this specific message on behalf of Milosevic,
the members of parliament were not prepared to entertain him. Their problem now
was that they could no longer trust their top general, or the advice he was offering,
and all of this seemed to vindicate the attempts made by Karadzic at Prijedor on 14
March to curtail his power and influence. To compound matters further it then
emerged that Mladic had recently been having regular meetings in Zvornik with
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“The authors (of the Belgrade weekly ‚Vreme‘, Filip Svarm and Petar Svacic) state that many think
that the basic motive of this turbo unification of the Serbs on the other side of the Drina river is in the
attempt to prevent Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to recognize the international borders of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. (...) Actually, the unification of Serbs across Drina into a state which should
be called ‘United Serb Krajina’, beyond all the bragging of the leaders over there, particularly Karadzic,
show more for the final breakdown of the project called ‘all Serbs in one state’ than ist renaissance.
”Belgrade weekly “Vreme”, May 29, 1995. Internet: http://mediafilter.org/MFF/Mon.sp.html
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