Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

XVIII.II.IV. Gespräch mit stellvertretendem Oberbefehlshaber ABiH a. D.
General Jovan Divjak. Sarajevo, 18. August 1997 1922 :
• Gab es im August 1995 Druck der USA auf die ABiH, so vorzugehen, wie in
Washington gewünscht?
„Im August 1995 war dem I. Korps ABiH das Ausbrechen aus Sarajevo von den USA
untersagt worden, sonst waren Offensiven in ganz Bosnien gestattet - bis zum
Erreichen des 51:49 Schlüssels! Die ABiH hätte mit NATO-Hilfe wesentlich mehr
zurückerobern können - auch Banja Luka. Das I. Korps ABiH durfte aber aus
politischen Gründen jedoch nicht offensiv werden.“
• Warum scheiterte die Juni-Offensive der ABiH bei Sarajevo?
„Bei der Juni-Offensive zur Sprengung des serbischen Belagerungsringes um
Sarajevo hatte die ABiH praktisch keine schweren Waffen zur Verfügung. So hatten
wir zum Beispiel keine schwere Artillerie über 155mm und keine Raketen sowie
zuwenig mechanisierte Einheiten gehabt. Zu Kriegsbeginn 1992 hatte die ABiH
überhaupt nur drei Panzer. Überdies waren die anderen bosnischen Korps nicht
bereit, einzugreifen. Bei Kriegsende hatte die ABiH insgesamt rund 100 Panzer, die
Serben hatten allein um Sarajevo immer rund 150 Panzer. Weiters kommt hinzu,
1922 “During four years of this war there were no problems in the BH Army units at the front lines
between the Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats. I personally witnessed their mutual tolerance, respect, help.
However, higher up, at the level of company or battalion commanders, you notice a different relation
towards soldiers of Serbian or Croatian nationality. Unfortunately, there were times when soldiers of
Serbian nationality were not allowed to the front lines. They dug trenches and executed other
engineering works. They also feared that they might get a bullet in the back of their head. In that
respect of the situation was especially difficult during 1993 and 1994. soldiers of Serbian nationality
were relieved of commanding duties and that very fact speaks that the relation and method established
by Karadzic, were accepted. Practically I meant ethnic cleansing. Let me remind that only five months
ago (in October 1995) Mr. Siber and I were on the retirement list. That was Izetbegovic’s explicit
demand, who offered me earlier to retire or to go to our embassy in Paris, allegedly because of my
knowledege of languages or, possibly to remain in the Army, but on the sidelines. In March and April
1993 five of us from the Headquarters offered a plan of operations for breaking a blockade of
Sarajevo. No one even looked at it. At one time the Presidency did not even consider the defence
strategy of BH. In early 1993 we submitted that project too. Truth to tell I sat on the fence, through no
fault of mine, but because the Commander of the Army, President Alija Izetbegovic, did not ask for my
opinion on any operation whatsoever!” Sarajevo-ethnic retirement. Ethnic Retirement of BH Army
Generals, AIM Sarajevo, 11 January, 1997. Internet:
htp://www.aimpress.ch/e/archive/data/97w04/970120/70120001.htm
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