Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

Srebrenica and Zepa. But was is true is that the Serbian army in Eastern Bosnia was
far stronger during their attacks in July and that both towns would have fallen also
without the conflict between the Bosnian leaders.“
• How would you analyse the possibility of taking of Banja Luka in September
- October 1995?
„It is not correct that it was a political decision to not take Banja Luka. At that time the
Bosnian Army was not strong enough to take Banja Luka by own strength. The
taking of Banja Luka would have been possible just by massive support of the
Croatian army and NATO-forces. The consequences would have been about 300
000 refugees from that area fleeing eastwards toward Serbia. Then Serbia would
have eventually intervened in the Bosnian war directly. Infact the taking of Banja
Luka would have surely led to a uncontrolable escalation of the war. That was what
the international community and the Croatian government knew. That’s why they did
not want to take Banja Luka from the Bosnian Serbs.“
• What were the reasons and aims of the military NATO-Engagement in
August - September 1995?
„The biggest effect the direct NATO-Engagement in August and September had on
the Bosnian Serbs was psychological. ALL Serbs realised that NATO did not bluff
anymore. Because of this the moral impact of the NATO-air raids was the biggest of
all. The military impacts were not too big indeed but the NATO-attacks lifted the
moral of the Bosnian troops strongly and eventually made the offensive of the
government forces in October/September possible.
The NATO-air raids were executed with clear political aims: To bring the landdistribution
in Bosnia to the before fixed 51:49 percent-key. At that time the Serbs
still held about 60 percent of the Bosnian soil. But they would not give up any part of
the occupied territory voluntarily – so force had to be used. The Bosnian government
had already accepted the 51:49 percent-key before the NATO-bombardings under
the condition that all refugees were allowed to return to their home villages after
peace is reached. In the Dayton-accord this has been internationally guaranteed.“
• What were the direct effects of the Split-aggreement in July 1995?
„I guess the Croatian government and army had already planned the offensive in the
Krajina before the agreement of Split has been signed in July. Through the Splitagreement
the interests of the Croats as well as the Bosnians and the interests of
the international community were saved. The Croats wanted to get in the back of the
Serbian lines and forces in the Croatian Krajina. The Bosnians wanted to get military
support from the HV to lower the military pressure put on them by the Serbs. The
485