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Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

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XVIII.I.III: Gespräch mit dem Kabinettschef des Präsidenten <strong>der</strong> moslemischkroatischen<br />

Fö<strong>der</strong>ation in Bosnien-Herzegowina <strong>Dr</strong>. Zoran Perkovic. Sarajevo,<br />

August 1997 1917 :<br />

• How would you describe the general situation in Bosnia in the beginning of<br />

1995?<br />

„In the beginning of 1995 all 3 war parties were on the edge of their power and<br />

absolutely exhaustet. They had already realized that none of them was strong<br />

enough to reach all his aims militarily. Infact the conditions were prepared for finding<br />

a compromise between the warring parties. The international community realized this<br />

fact and got engaged more and more in the conflict to end the war because the<br />

radical aims of all parties could not be reached.“<br />

• Why did the cease-fire in Bosnia break down in spring 1995?<br />

„When Western Europeans think of an army they usually think in the terms and<br />

catagories of Western European armies with clear and well structured authorities<br />

controlled be democratic political structures and well organized and disciplined<br />

troops. You cannot compare these armies to the armies fighting in Bosnia. Here we<br />

mostly got undisciplined troops beside very strong local authorities and comman<strong>der</strong>s<br />

and a very often found lack of control by political structures. We must not forget that<br />

beside that some people lived quite good from the war and of course did not want it<br />

to be ended. Infact some of the units of all three warring parties were not un<strong>der</strong> direct<br />

control. The Army of BiH (ABiH) was not allowed to commit any war crimes neither<br />

was the HVO. But as I said some uncontrolled units undoubtedly commited terrible<br />

war crimes. The units of the ABiH were un<strong>der</strong> political control of the Bosnian<br />

government.“<br />

• What was the background of the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995?<br />

„Srebrenica was a very small munipalicy, Zepa even was not. The conflicts between<br />

military and civilian authorities and between military authorities of the ABiH in July<br />

1995 cannot be compared to the conflicts during the Bosnian offensive to Banja Luka<br />

in September/October. The conflicts before the fall of Srebrenica in July were just on<br />

a very small scale level between local authorities, not among the higher lea<strong>der</strong>s.<br />

The military wanted to blame the civilian authorities for the fall of Srebrenica and<br />

Zepa. They tried to pledge the governmental authorities guilty for the defeat in<br />

1917<br />

Zoran Perkovic, Kroate, war vor dem bosnischen Krieg Justizminister und während des Krieg in<br />

<strong>der</strong> Regierung von Herzeg-Bosna gewesen. Nach dem Daytoner Vertrag ist er stellvertreten<strong>der</strong><br />

Minister im Justizministerium <strong>der</strong> Fö<strong>der</strong>ation, danach Kabinettschef des Präsidenten <strong>der</strong> Fö<strong>der</strong>ation.<br />

484

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