Die militärischen Handlungsschemata der ... - Dr. Alois Mock

Kopf der Planungen vor Angriffsbeginn ist General Ryan mit seinem Staff. “In fact,
Ryan had arrived in the CAOC on the morning of the 28 th to exercise the VULCAN
protection plan for Sarajevo. With an actual crisis at hand, the general cancelled
VULCAN and focused his staff on activating and modifying, as necessary, the
operational plans and unit reinforcements that comprised what amounted to the
DELIBERATE FORCE plan. While waiting for orders to start operations and approval
of the initial target list by General Janvier and Admiral Smith, the AIRSOUTH
commander concentrated on alerting his units, refining the air tasking message that
would guide their operations for the first day of bombing, and bringing additional air
and support forces into the theatre, as required. The delay on starting operations
was useful here, in that it provided time to flow additional US Air Force, Navy, and
Marine aircraft into Aviano and to swing the carrier Theodore Roosevelt into the
Adriatic in time to launch aircraft on the first strikes. (…) Ryan and Admiral Smith
were in full agreement that the diplomatic sensitivities of the campaign made
collateral damage an issue of pivotal strategic importance. Ryan believed that a stray
bomb that caused civilian casualties would take the interventionists off the moral high
ground, marshal world opinion against the air campaign, and probably bring it to a
halt before it had its intended effects. Ryan’s command was ready for operations by
the end of the 29 th .” 1443
Wichtig für das politische Ziel der Bombenangriffe ist für die verhandlungeführenden
USA, nach außen keinesfalls den Eindruck entstehen zu lassen, man schlage sich
jetzt auf eine Seite. Das würde den Verhandlungsfortgang erschweren, wenn nicht
unmöglich machen. Die Luftschläge müssen daher zumindest in der Anfangsphase
als notwendige und angemessene aber begrenzte und nur auf die bosnischen
Serben zielende Reaktion auf das nunmehr offiziell aus serbischer Urheberschaft
In one innovation, U.S. Air Force pilots flying over Bosnia were able to use sophisticated electronic
simulators that showed them their assigned flights in ‘virtual-reality’ images. Also, all North Atlantic
Treaty Organization pilots are benefiting from a new American-made high-speed system that provides
complete intelligence ‘snapshots’ of their target areas before the next air strike is launched. The
procedure, known as the Contingency Air Reconnaissance System, catalogüs information from
satellites, spy planes, sensors and radio intercepts and feeds it back to air commanders within two
hours.” Art Pine, Times Staff Writer. Bosnia: Persian Gulf lessons fuel high-tech Bosnia Air War. 01.
September 1995. Los Angeles Times 1/9/95. S. 13
1443 Robert C. Owen, USAF. The Balkans Air Campaign Study. Part 2. Zit. nach Robert C. Owen,
“Synopsis of Interview of General Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH, AFSOUTH HQ, Napels IT, 1030-
1200, Tuesday, 5 Dec 1995,” AFHRA, BACS files. Internet: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/ops/docs/apj--fall97-owen.html
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