World Energy Outlook 2006

HLW disposal is more contentious than disposal of lower-level wastes and no
country today has an operating disposal site for high-level waste. Though wide
technical consensus exists on the adequacy of geological disposal of HLW, it has not
yet won general public consent. In some countries, however, there are volunteer
communities to host repositories. Table 13.7 provides examples of strategies to deal
with HLW. The search for politically acceptable solutions continues.
Proliferation and International Conventions
Effective safeguards against nuclear weapons proliferation are required as long
as nuclear technologies generate, or can be used to generate, weapons-grade
fissile material, irrespective of whether the material is designated for use in
nuclear power plants, medical, agricultural or other peaceful applications. At
the centre of the international non-proliferation regime is the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed in 1970 and extended
indefinitely in 1995. To advance the goal of non-proliferation, the Treaty
established a system of safeguards under the responsibility of the IAEA.
Recent events have shown that the NPT needs to be further strengthened.
Improvements required involve enhanced verification and inspection through
the universal adoption of the so-called “Additional Protocol”, and possibly
restrictions on the use of weapon-usable material (plutonium and high enriched
uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes. The processing of such material and
the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment could be
limited to international centres, under appropriate rules of transparency, control
and assurance of supply on a non-discriminatory basis, under strict IAEA
control. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), recently proposed by
the United States, and the offer by the Russian Federation to set up a global
network of nuclear fuel cycle services (supply of enriched fuel and recovery of
used fuel) are concepts designed to enhance transparency and control over
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and would go a long way towards
strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The International Project on
Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and the Generation IV
International Forum (GIF) are technology-related efforts further to reduce
nuclear proliferation risks and better to address the problem of radioactive waste.
Other components of the international non-proliferation regime include
verification and development of proliferation-resistant technology, export
controls on nuclear and nuclear-related material and equipment, the
creation of nuclear weapons-free zones, controls against illicit trafficking of
nuclear material and the physical protection of nuclear installations.
Safeguards development will need to keep pace with the expansion of
nuclear power.
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© OECD/IEA, 2007