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LE SYMPOSIUM INTERNATIONAL LE LIVRE. LA ROUMANIE. L ...

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Mithradates’ foot soldiers at the Battle of chaeronea 379<br />

VI eupator had inherited from his father, and for a long time he strived to<br />

maintain it. Since, however, Mithradates desired to expand his kingdom,<br />

while rome insisted on preserving the balance of powers around the<br />

province of Asia, the republic and the pontic kingdom were on a collision<br />

course. the tension turned to conflict and the conflict flared into outright<br />

war in the year 89. Mithradates quickly overcame the ill-prepared roman<br />

forces and became master of Asia Minor. 6 Desiring to push the battlefield<br />

upon which his forces and the forces of rome would clash as far away<br />

from his possessions as possible, he sent one of his most trusted generals,<br />

Archelaos, to Athens. the general appointed by the roman Senate to<br />

confront Mithradates’ forces was Sulla. In spite of the fact that he had<br />

been declared a public enemy at home, the roman general continued his<br />

campaign and the first major encounter with the pontic forces was at Athens<br />

and piraeus, which the romans besieged and finally took in 86.<br />

After losing Athens to Sulla and considering that his position at piraeus<br />

is not tenable in the long run, Archelaos made full use of his maritime<br />

supremacy and retreated by sea to euboea and thence to the pass of<br />

thermopylae, where he made the junction with the troops brought from<br />

Macedon by taxiles. At the same time, Sulla was compelled to follow him,<br />

for two main reasons. on the one hand, his troops could hardly find food<br />

in Attica – a region which had a hard time feeding its inhabitants even in<br />

times of peace and had, moreover, been devastated by the lengthy siege of<br />

Athens. on the other hand, in Greece had arrived the vanguard of another<br />

roman army, led by hortensius, and he feared that the legate and his troops<br />

would be annihilated by the pontic troops if left to their fate.<br />

Sulla succeeded in joining hortensius, but his position continued<br />

to appear weak. After all, he found himself in Beotia, a region where<br />

wide valleys opened up between mountains, offering suitable terrain for<br />

in the third punic War and against Aristonikos: App., Mithr., 30 and App., Mithr., 39,<br />

respectively. A useful summary of the information available about Mithradates IV and<br />

Mithradates V may be found in McGing, 1986, 34-42.<br />

6 to most ancient writers and modern scholars, this is a clear clue that eupator<br />

had been preparing this conflict for a long time (thus, among others, Sulla’s discourse<br />

as reported in App., Mithr., 57.230-58.239 and plut., Sull., 24). Callataÿ notes that the<br />

minting of coins by the pontic king accelerates greatly only in May-June 89 (CAllAtAŸ,<br />

1997, 282-284), which may lead one to believe Mithradates did not prepare for the conflict<br />

well in advance, but this is unlikely, given that during this age kings were content to use<br />

any coins that were at their disposal, including coins issued by former kings of their own<br />

dynasty or even foreign coins that had reached them as a result of taxation of trade or in the<br />

form of booty. Besides, even Callataÿ agrees that Mithradates may have seen the conflict<br />

with rome as inevitable as early as 95 (CAllAtAŸ, 1997, 274).

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