LE SYMPOSIUM INTERNATIONAL LE LIVRE. LA ROUMANIE. L ...

Mithradates’ foot soldiers at the Battle of chaeronea 387
there was, however, another aspect to this reality: not the military, but the
social and the economic one, and this irritated not so much the romans, but
their Greek allies. Being a Chaeronean himself, plutarch feels the need to
transmit this sense of anger, which had reached him no doubt in the form
of oral tradition.
the question that needs to be asked is this – how much can we read
into this fact, namely the presence in the pontic army of slaves liberated adhoc?
Is this a simple military expedient? Is it part of a larger social strategy
devised by Mithradates, designed to shake the foundations of traditional
polis-type communities? If so, what could he possibly have hoped to
achieve?
It must be said that in the early stages of the war, Mithradates was
particularly careful to befriend the Anatolian communities, while allowing
full rein to brutalities against romans and Italians. the so-called ephesian
Vespers, the mass murder of Italian citizens in Anatolia was considered
by most observers of the age to be the blood bond between himself and
the Greek poleis. even in Athens, Mithradates’ troops had not entered as
conquerors, but rather as trusted allies, after Archelaos had put down the
revolt in Delos and handed the isle back to the Athenians (App., Mithr., 108).
on the other hand, in the north, Mithradates’ son, Arcathias, was delayed
while dividing Macedonia into satrapies, or so the rumour had it. this no
doubt reminded many Greeks of another monarch from the east who had
invaded Greece by way of Macedonia, and this impression could not have
been mitigated by the fact that pontic troops rampaged the country, sacking
even sanctuaries such as that at lebadeia. one might be tempted to think
that Mithradates played the card of friendship just so long as it suited him,
after which, considering he needed more leverage in his relation with the
Greek poleis, he took steps to expand the citizen pool, including in it people
faithful to him personally. this hypothesis might serve, certainly, for Asia
Minor, where slaves released as a consequence of their support during the
ephesian Vespers remained within their cities and could, as a consequence,
lobby for the king’s wishes from within the system. on the other hand, in
Greece we see slaves extracted from their cities and therefore having their
political influence seriously undermined. When one adds the thought that
these men were constantly facing the danger of physical elimination on
the field of battle, the idea that Mithradates was interested in creating and
strengthening a new class of citizens and thus enact a social revolution
in Greece becomes untenable. It is much more likely that Mithradates’
generals, seeking safety in numbers, required a very large number of troops
and the only source of eager volunteers was this.