An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax

elate clauses by juxtaposition, the placing together of clauses, sentences, phrases
without a logically subordinating particle, instead of by subordinating clauses,
sentences, phrases by a logical particle. 4
g Because of such differences in strategic use of grammatical structures, the Hebrew
idiom ought not to be rendered word-for-word into English. At best such a translation
would be awkward, and at worst it would actually misrepresent the Hebrew.
Rendering ordinary Hebrew idiom with an abnormal English convention might
suggest to an English-speaking audience that the Hebrew writer had sought to
emphasize or intensify some unlikely aspect of thought. The abnormal English
expression ‘the ox, the bronze’ for ת ֶשׁ ֹח֫ ְנּה ַ רקָ בָּ ה ַ (2 Kgs 16:17) misrepresents the
Hebrew, which is a simple apposition. Not infrequently a word-for-word translation,
instead of faithfully representing the original text, actually distorts it.
[Page 229] 12.2 Apposition, Similarity, and Identity
a The most difficult point about appositional constructions is the quality of the shared
reference. In וֹנתֹח ְ וֹרתִי ְ ‘Jethro, his father-in-law,’ there is, if Moses has one wife
and she has one father, complete identity between ורתי and ונ תח.
5 In ןהֹכּ ֵ ה ַ רתָי ָ בְ א ֶ
‘Abiathar the priest,’ there is a limited but clear overlap: the phrase means a certain
Abiathar—no other—and it does not claim that he was the only priest. The shared
reference in ־שׁ ֵשׁ בהָ ז ָ תוֹא ֵמ is of a different sort: the unit (‘six hundred’) and the
measured thing (‘gold’) jointly point to a certain quantity of gold. 6
b It is helpful to review three philosophical distinctions implicitly involved here,
though we must not allow metaphysics to dictate grammar. 7 First, Aristotle
distinguishes between “matter” and “form.” Every individual thing is said to consist
both of matter and of the particular form imposed upon the physical matter that gives
it its identity. Second, Aristotle also distinguishes between “substance” and
“accidence”; substances are persons or things, of which accidental properties can be
predicated. Names, as well as pronouns and phrases that identify a definite person or
thing, are regarded as substantival; accidental properties involve quantity, quality,
relation, action, place, state, etc. Thus, accidental properties qualify substantives.
Third, on another view of ontology, we can say that particular terms are qualified by
universal (or “generic” or “general”) terms, that is, particular terms mark out
particular persons or things. Terms for persons or things do not in themselves denote
individuals; rather, they denote either a class of individuals or qualities, states,
4
For a discussion of this point, with good examples, see G. B. Caird, The Language
and Imagery of the Bible (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980) 118.
5
For the sake of this argument, we assume that ḥōtēn means ‘father-in-law’ in every
sense.
6
The English distinction between restrictive and nonrestrictive modifiers does not
match any pattern in Hebrew usage.
7
See further John Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 1968) 403–5, 424–28.