Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

administration in operation 187
action, it is less clear that tax-payers benefited from having to supplement
their regular payments by a variety of fees (sportulae): in the western empire,
these might amount to over a third of the total sum collected, though in
the east the amounts were very substantially lower. 105 It would, however, be
possible to interpret these customary exactions as a substitute for higher
official salaries, and hence higher taxes, with correspondingly larger opportunities
for graft, which was harder to control than the recognized sportulae;
they might almost be regarded as a form of indirect taxation, with the
subjects contributing directly towards the salaries of officials, who in turn
contributed to the income of their superiors and ultimately to that of the
emperor. In response to such indirect taxation, autopragium, the right to pay
directly to a representative of the central administration, was a valuable
privilege which cut out profiteering middlemen. 106
These perquisites are categorized as one aspect of the endemic corruption
which has been canvassed as an explanation for the empire’s demise. 107
It is, however, impossible to prove that the situation in late antiquity was any
worse than in preceding centuries, and payment for securing a post was
accepted, indeed on occasions regulated by emperors. Thus office-holders,
like the magistrates of republican Rome who had bribed the electorate, had
to recoup their costs: the first permanent court in Rome had been established
to deal with the issue of recuperation of wealth wrongly acquired by
Romans in the provinces, while 750 years later a governor of Sardinia was,
to pope Gregory’s disgust, prepared to accept protection money to permit
the continuation of polytheist practices since he had to repay his sportula. 108
But, to an extent, corruption is in the eye of the beholder, or dependent on
circumstances. 109 Justinian legislated against the sale of offices and appears
to have made a determined attempt to eradicate the practice – for example,
by providing compensation for lost income to those who had traditionally
controlled the disposal of the office; on the other hand, although Procopius’
allegation that Justinian was himself selling offices again only a year after
this legislation is open to doubt, both Justin II and Tiberius also legislated
on the subject; John the Lydian both condemns and accepts the custom, and
the upright Gregory was prepared to give bribes to ensure that Leontius’
financial investigation in Sicily was speedily ended. 110 Sale of offices was
regarded as a sign of personal greed, and is a stock accusation against
unpopular ministers or rulers, but its overall impact on the administration
is unclear: the practice seems usually to have been restricted to provincial
offices and rarely to have extended to the most powerful positions at
105 Jones, LRE 467–8; this calculation is based on the consolidation of fees under Majorian in 458.
106 Cass. Variae xii.8.2. 107 MacMullen (1988). 108 Greg. Reg. v.38.
109 Heidenheimer, Johnstone and Levine (1979) 21; 88–90.
110 Nov. 8; Procop. Secret History 21.4; 24.6; Nov. 149, 161; John Lydus, De Mag. iii.66–7; Greg.Reg.
ix.130. Cf. Kelly in CAH xiii.171–80.
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