Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

administration in operation 189
example of methods of controlling regional officials, by the despatch or
assignation from the centre of a special officer, such as the cancellarii and
canonicarii appointed to provinces by Cassiodorus when praetorian
prefect. 116 Other methods were the encouragement of reports by junior
staff on superiors, and the public apportionment of praise and blame, as
for example in the letters of appointment which were read out in the
senate. 117 Imperial concern for fairness is also evident in Zeno’s law which
stipulated that governors must wait in their provinces for fifty days after the
end of their term of office in order to be available to answer complaints. It
had never been easy for provincials to gain access to their former governors,
and this law refers to the means of circumventing its good intentions:
the former governors were to be present in the public places of major
towns, not hiding in sanctuaries or the houses of powerful friends. By
contrast, Justinian expounded on the glory which honest governors might
win from himself and provincials. 118 Distance from the court, the source
of redress and centre of supervision, increased the chances of corruption,
as Cassiodorus was well aware. It also enhanced provincial discontent:
embittered plaintiffs and refugees fleeing the exactions of John the
Cappadocian’s agents seem to have contributed to the Nika riot in 532; in
410 the inhabitants of remote Britain and Armorica had thrown out the
imperial administration altogether. 119
The system had numerous imperfections, and human nature ensured
that many opportunities for enrichment and advancement were exploited,
but blanket condemnation is inappropriate. At Edessa in 497 the governor
Alexander placed a complaints box in front of his residence, and every
Friday he gave judgement free of charge in the church of John the Baptist
and Addai; the governor Demosthenes organized charitable relief during
the Edessa famine of 502, and after the Antioch earthquake of 526 the
effectiveness of count Ephrem’s actions prompted the inhabitants to select
him as their next bishop. 120 It might, however, be significant that these
examples of responsive government occur in provincial or metropolitan
capitals, whereas in smaller cities and more remote areas it may have been
harder for the central government to have an impact on local practices;
implementation of the imperial will now required the presence of a representative
of the administration, since the inclination or ability of local
councillors to act had diminished along with their status. It is also the case
that evidence for good conduct by officials has to be treated with the same
degree of scepticism as for complaints: it would be misguided to rely on
116 Brown, Gentlemen and Officers 152–3; Cass. Variae xi.10; xii.1; Morosi (1978).
117 Blockley (1969); Lendon (1997) 191–201; Cass. Variae viii.13.1; 20.1–2; cf.i.25; iii.20; iv.29;
ix.12. 118 CJ i.49.1; Nov. 8; 10.
119 Cass. Variae vi.22.1–2; ix.12.4; John Lydus, De Mag. iii.70; Justinian, Nov. 8; Zos. vi.5.
120 Joshua 29; 42–3; Malalas 423–4.
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