Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

christianity and laws on the family 393
most sensational measure was passed: the abrogation of the ancient law
whereby a marriage ceased with the withdrawal of consent of just one of
the spouses. Repudium was thus authorized only in cases of extreme gravity.
Admittedly, there were other situations in which the bond could be dissolved,
but the responsible party incurred heavy sanctions: the wife lost her
dowry, relinquished all claim to her possessions in the marital house and
suffered deportation; the husband, on the other hand, had to return the
dowry and, if he remarried, his former wife could take possession of his
second wife’s dowry. Wives, moreover, were explicitly denied the right to
repudiate their husbands on general grounds of immorality. 2
In so far as the moral code of a minority group can be expected to
influence the laws and ancient traditions of a large empire in a short space
of time, this set of measures unequivocally shows the mark of
Christianity. 3 Nevertheless, certain historians, even in recent times, have
tended to deny that Christian morality had any influence on Constantine’s
family legislation, or at least to minimize its influence considerably; some
have even extended their scepticism to cover much of late antique legislation.
In so doing, however, they would appear to be conditioned not
only by an abstract concept of ‘Christian legislation’ (i.e. one more or less
consciously based on the twelfth- and thirteenth-century collections of
canon law) but also by the relations between the papacy and the European
states in the Middle Ages. In their search for symmetries, they claim that
Christian influence is attested only where there is a ‘perfect identity’
between Christian doctrine and Roman law; they emphasize the
deficiencies and excesses of imperial law; they suggest that a decisive contribution
was made by pagan philosophical doctrine and that the imposition
of a stricter morality reflected a revival of traditional Roman values;
finally, they appeal to the independent evolution of the law. 4 None of
these arguments are new, for, broadly speaking, the same ground was
covered almost a century and half ago by the debate on Troplong’s work. 5
And there are, in fact, two good reasons why the two conflicting opinions
have been periodically confronting one another ever since then. The first,
which in itself carries no negative implications, is that the subject itself
inevitably leaves a wide margin for interpretation. The second, which is
undeniably detrimental, is that the general terms of the problem are inadequately
defined.
2 C.Th. iii.16.1.
3 For a balanced account of the effects of Constantine’s conversion on his legislation, see
Liebeschuetz (1979) 277 (on the family, in particular p. 295).
4 Among the more recent works, see, for example, with varying degrees of emphasis, Gaudemet
(1978a); Castello (1983); Sargenti (1986); Bagnall (1987); Evans Grubbs (1995); for the position of
women, see in particular Arjava (1996). 5 Troplong (1843).
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