Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

306 11. the army, c. 420,602
One indication of the underlying strength of eastern arrangements was
the empire’s ability, at least in the short term, to surmount the ravages of
the Great Plague, which struck first in 541/2 and then flared up in various
parts of the empire throughout the rest of the century. Mortality was certainly
highest in the large cities, which were of limited relevance to the
recruitment or supply of armies, but there were also deaths among farmers
and disruption to agriculture, and concentrations of soldiers must also
have been liable to high casualties. Thus, although the overall severity of
the plague may be debated, it would have destabilized a system that was
already insecure. In fact, however, it is difficult to detect any direct or immediate
impact. 74 There is no apparent decline in the size of eastern armies
after the 540s: few precise figures are available, but in the Strategikon of
Maurice a force of between 5,000 and 15,000 is considered to be well proportioned,
which accords with the sizes of Justinianic expeditionary forces
for the west in the 530s. Complaints about shortages of soldiers under
Tiberius and Maurice were caused in part by simultaneous campaigns on
two or more frontiers: diversion of resources to the east left the Balkans
and Italy vulnerable, but this problem of juggling available manpower to
meet different commitments had existed since the reign of Augustus. 75
There is also no clear increase in the proportion of non-Roman troops
serving in the armies, another possible sign of a decline in available Roman
manpower. Here definitions are important, since Roman armies had traditionally
contained a large number of soldiers whom a blue-blooded aristocrat
in Rome would have regarded as uncivilized, but who nevertheless
originated from within the empire – and it is this which is the crucial consideration
for an emperor’s ability to control and organize military recruitment,
whereas subjective judgements on barbarization are less relevant.
Thus, soldiers might be Goth or Armenian by racial origin, but be subject
to the Roman emperor as tax-paying inhabitants. Emperors recruited from
outside their frontiers when necessary, but such foreigners were merely one
element within an army that was already heterogeneous. 76 The largest single
foreign recruitment was probably that initiated by Tiberius in 574, when it
was essential to rebuild the eastern armies very quickly and a new force of
Tiberiani, numbering perhaps 15,000, was raised. 77 Otherwise, emperors
continued a pragmatic policy of exploiting the military potential of available
tribes or war-bands but without creating a non-Roman army: enlistment
of Lombards, Goths and even Anglo-Saxons in the late sixth century
was balanced by recruitment from Cappadocia or Mesopotamia, as carried
out by Maurice in 578 and Philippicus in 584.
74 Whitby (1995) sec. 6.
75 Maurice Strat. iii.8, 10; Menander frr. 21, 22; for problems in the early fifth century, cf.
Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops 129. 76 Whitby (1995) sec. 7.
77 Evagr. HE v.14 with Theophanes 251.24–8.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008