Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

474 17. armies and society in the later roman world
Isaurian Illus; thereafter, throughout the sixth century, eastern emperors
retained control of their military establishment. Emperors did not campaign
in person, with the exception of a planned expedition by Zeno and
two sorties into the Balkans by Maurice, but most had some experience of
active command before reaching the throne. Relatives of Anastasius,
Justinian, Justin II, Maurice, Phocas and Heraclius regularly served as generals.
Members, particularly officers, of the imperial bodyguard could also
be expected to be loyal after promotion to independent command:
Belisarius and Sittas under Justinian, Comentiolus under Maurice. Thus,
Belisarius declined to exploit his African or Italian successes against
Justinian, even when Justinian’s unpopularity gave hope of success. A
further source of reliable generals were the leaders of relatively small tribal
groups, especially those with a short history of contact with the Romans,
men such as the Gepid Mundo, the Slav Chilbuldius or the Herul Philemuth.
Eunuchs were another type of dependable outsiders: Solomon, a former
retainer of Belisarius, was Justinian’s most successful commander in Africa
after the reconquest, while the Persarmenian Narses, an outsider in two
senses, controlled distant Italy from 552 until his death in Justin II’s reign.
It is difficult to cite comparable examples from the western empire,
where the military tended to dominate civilians, in contrast to the east,
where civilians managed the military. The career of Belisarius, the rival of
Aetius as the most famous general in this period, illustrates the latter point.
Belisarius’ origins were sufficiently obscure for his parents’ names to be
unrecorded, but service in the bodyguard of the future emperor Justinian
led to military command in 527. In due course, glamorous victories in the
west brought him a devoted army, enormous wealth and the chance of a
royal throne at Ravenna, but he could still be humbled by the emperor, symbolically
in the triumph that commemorated his Vandal victory when he
performed obeisance to Justinian beside the captive Gelimer, and effectively
in 542 when he lost control of his personal following. It is possible that personal
weakness and indecision, faults noted in Procopius’ Secret History,
played a part in Belisarius’ failure to assert himself more fully, but his position
was also undermined by the sheer size of the eastern empire and the
diversity of its armed forces: these ensured that the dominance of any great
figure was always likely to be challenged. Belisarius’ problems with uncooperative
colleagues or subordinates in Italy in the late 530s and 540s can be
paralleled by dissension in the eastern army in 502–3, and again in the 570s
and 580s: the issue was not confined to one individual.
The ability of the civilian élite to marginalize the general is relevant to
the ultimate failure of conspiracies and usurpations in the east until those
of Phocas and Heraclius. Only the attempt of Basiliscus achieved brief
success, and this was virtually a dynastic squabble, since he was the brother
of Zeno’s mother-in-law, Verina; even so, Zeno quickly mobilized sufficient
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