Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

eastern survival 311
Avars, who should probably be credited with introducing into European
warfare a simple type of siege engine, a counter-weighted stone thrower,
that was propelled by human muscle power. But even the Huns and Avars
also had to rely on human waves to overcome defences, and the ability of
their leaders to force subject populations to suffer the enormous casualties
of such assaults was a significant demonstration of their authority. These
mass attacks involved the assembly of very large numbers of men, and it
is perhaps not surprising that the Avars were incapable of maintaining a
long siege outside Thessalonica or Constantinople, where the defenders
could exploit their control of the sea to supply themselves. 95 Other tribal
groups had to rely on protracted blockade, inducements to treachery, or the
luck of a surprise assault, as is revealed in the numerous sieges during the
Roman reconquest of Italy or in the Slav migrations into the Balkans. 96
In Europe strong defences coupled with a determined garrison tended
to thwart attackers: Roman armies were reluctant to risk heavy losses in
frontal assaults, while their tribal enemies could usually find easier sources
of booty. In Africa after the Justinianic reconquest the importance of
defences is revealed by the attention devoted to the construction and repair
of forts: from these bases a relatively small garrison could hope to withstand
Moorish raids, and hence retain control of the province. 97 On the
eastern frontier the balance of power and skills was much more even. The
Persians had the technical capacity and logistical organization to sustain
long and active sieges of fortresses and walled cities: in 502/3 Amida fell
after three months, while in 573 it took six months to capture Dara. Here
the solution for the Romans was to keep all defences in good order since,
as the fall of Antioch in 540 demonstrated, the Persians were quick to
exploit any weakness. It is not surprising that Anastasius and Justinian, but
particularly the latter, achieved reputations for constructing major
fortifications, since both had to react to successful Persian aggression. 98
Discipline was a recurrent problem, and there was a sequence of mutinies
in eastern armies which culminated in the military revolt that toppled
Maurice and placed the officer Phocas on the throne in 602. 99 Part of the
problem was caused by the variety of allied contingents present. Belisarius
en route to Africa executed two Huns at Abydus, a punishment that nearly
provoked their compatriots to mutiny; Narses in Italy in 552 found his
Lombard allies a mixed blessing, and immediately after the defeat of Totila
he paid them off and sent them back to their Balkan homes. Roman recruits,
however, were far from perfect: Belisarius complained of the inexperience
95 Whitby, Maurice 172–3; Chron. Pasch. 717.1–726.10; Miracula S. Demetrii i.156–60, ii.212–13.
96 Procop. Wars vii is dominated by accounts of sieges; see Thompson (1982) 82–6.
97 Pringle (1981) 89–120; Procop. Buildings vi.5–7.
98 Procop. Wars i.7.29; John Eph. HE vi.5; Procop. Wars ii.8; Procop. Buildings ii,iii.
99 Discussion in Kaegi (1981) chs. 3–5.
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