Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

the era of aetius, 425,54 7
As we have seen, the Goths of Aquitaine threatened Arles, the second
city of the empire, in 426. A second revolt against Roman power led by a
Gothic noble, Anaolsus, unfolded in 430, but this was perhaps the unsanctioned,
independent action of an autonomous sub-leader. The Vandals
were even more active. In the mid 420s, they first dramatically expanded
their range of action in the Iberian peninsula, and then in 429 took the decisive
step of crossing en masse to Mauretania in North Africa. With their
departure, the Sueves were free to extend their attacks on the Roman population
of Gallaecia in both 430 and 431 (Hydat. Chron. 81[91], 86[96]).
Rhenish groups, likewise, exploited the power vacuum. Counterattacks are
recorded against the Franks in 428 and 432, and, in 430 and 431, the
Alamanni raided across the frontier.
All this directly threatened the empire’s survival. To put it simply, the
Roman state taxed the agricultural production of its dependent territories
to pay for a powerful army and a political-cum-administrative establishment.
7 Any loss of territory through permanent annexation or temporary
damage in warfare thus meant loss of revenue and a weakening of the state
machine. The pragmatic realization on the part of immigrant leaders that,
in the early fifth century, the Roman state was still the most powerful political
and military force of its day, and hence demanded some show of deference,
did not make them any less assertive of independent political
interests, nor those interests any less inimical to the Roman state. 8
Moreover, any weakening of the Roman state (permanent or temporary)
had the more insidious effect of breaking down ties between local Roman
élites and the imperial centre. Again reducing the matter to basics, it can be
said that the late Roman élite consisted of a geographically widespread
class of local landowners, who also participated in imperial institutions.
They did so because the Roman state offered protection and legitimation
of their position at home and, via imperial careers, substantial additional
opportunities for making money and acquiring influence. This extra wealth
and power, together with the lifelong rights and privileges which were part
and parcel of an imperial career, further strengthened the landowners’
position within their local societies. 9
When, because of the appearance of outside military forces, the Roman
state was no longer in a position to sustain local élites (and hence to constrain
their loyalties, either), the whole point of their attachment to the empire disappeared.
As a result, they had to look elsewhere for props to their position,
notably to whichever barbarian immigrant group was currently most powerful
in their own locality. For some, perhaps those with most invested in the
imperial system, the process of psychological adjustment to the decline of
7 On its workings: Jones LRE ch. 13. Structural importance: Wickham (1984).
8 For a different view, Goffart (1981) 295ff. and Goffart (1989) 93ff.
9 On careers, Matthews, (1975) ch. 1 and passim; Heather (1994) 25ff.
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