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administrative change 197
produce. 149 In this case, gold coin would be recycled through the tax
system, though if payment was arranged by the allocation of a notional
credit to the individual’s tax account, the effect of coemptio would be to
demonetize local economies by removing the need for tax-payers to obtain
coinage, thus reversing the impact of adaeratio. This conflict of effects indicates
that the imperial administration focused on certain specific objectives
– a need for coin in one area at one time, a reserve of supplies at
another – and that planning at a macroeconomic level was, not surprisingly,
beyond the capacity of officials and the information available to them.
Economic theory has rarely matched practical reality. Because adaeratio
entailed greater reliance on coemptiones, there was a danger that the latter
could merge into a permanent supplement to the annual tax levy, a superindiction:
Anastasius, who permitted the extension of adaeratio, had to
decree that coemptiones were not a regular part of the tax system. 150 The
estates of the potentiores were particularly liable to coemptio, presumably
because these could deliver the necessary surpluses, and there was a prohibition
on exactions from those with no surplus, but there were still alleged
cases of coemptiones being levied on regions which could not supply the
produce locally. 151 The practice of coemptio required the state to take greater
heed of fluctuating harvests and the need to move produce around the
empire: instead of extracting the regular tax indiction in kind, the state
obtained money with which it could purchase its necessities from the most
suitable places. Customs dues had always been an important source of
imperial revenue, and even in the fourth century provincial governors had
exploited the grain market to profit from public stocks, 152 but there are
signs of tighter control from the centre in the sixth century. Anastasius
created important customs posts at the Bosphorus and Hellespont, whose
lucrative operation was overhauled by Justinian, and recaptured Iotabe, an
island in the Red Sea which had housed a customs post; Justinian established
state monopolies in various goods which he then licensed to individuals,
with the result that prefects of Alexandria and governors of Lazica
could be accused of behaving like merchants in their operation of these. 153
Even Anastasius’ abolition of the chrysargyron could contribute to this
picture, since by forgoing the modest gold revenues derived from taxing
149 Cass. Variae xii.22.1–2; cf. also CJ appendix 7 (Pragmatic Sanction 22). State storage: Amm.
Marc. xxviii.1.7 with Vanags (1979); Procop. Secret History 22.14–18.
150 CJ Appendix 7 (Pragmatic Sanction 26) might suggest that the landowners of Apulia and
Calabria regarded regular coemptio and superindictions as similar; CJ x.27 (Anastasius).
151 C.Th. xi.15.2; CJ x.27.2.4 (Anastasius); Cass. Variae xii.14.6. Other examples of corrupt practices:
Agathias, Hist. iv.21–2 for the activities of John the Libyan; Cass. Variae ii.26.2; CJ Appendix 7
(Pragmatic Sanction 18); Procop. Secret History 23.11–14.
152 De Rebus Bellicis 4.1; cf. Peter Barsymes: Procop. Secret History 22.14–22; perhaps also Maurice and
the Egyptian grain: John of Nikiu 95.21.
153 Stein, Bas-Empire ii.196–7; Procop. Secret History 25.1–10; 20.4; 25.13–26; 26.36–9. Leo and Zeno
had prohibited the licensing of monopolies by palace officials: CJ iv.59.1–2.
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