Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

eastern survival 313
dictated the development of Monocarton. The need to increase the security
of the Armenian frontier led Justinian to strengthen Martyropolis and
construct a new fortress at Citharizon: these eastern forts were focal
points for future campaigns, an indication of their strategic impact. 103 In
the Balkans, the Danube had a number of known crossing points which
Roman garrisons could observe, and south of the frontier there were relatively
few passes over the Haemus, Rhodope and Pindus ranges, so that
Roman defenders, if well prepared, could anticipate the movements of
raiding parties and attack when appropriate. 104 No emperor could afford
to neglect his armies for long, and although it might make good propaganda
to blame problems on a predecessor’s mistakes or inaction, such
accusations need to be treated cautiously.
Diplomacy was an essential element in the structure of Roman defences,
its efficacy depending on the availability of military force to back up promises,
and its operations often being conducted by, or at least in conjunction
with, military commanders. Relations with Persia were organized sysematically,
as befitted long-standing neighbours who were bound by a number
of common interests as much as antagonized by points of dispute.
Diplomatic exchanges were structured, with minor embassies following
major missions and envoys travelling according to a schedule and being
welcomed in Constantinople in set form. 105
Throughout most of the fifth and sixth centuries the Romans remained
on the defensive in the east: emperors had pressing concerns in the Balkans
and the west and little expectation of territorial gain in Mesopotamia or
Armenia, so that the combined objective of diplomacy and military
defences was to deter Persian aggression, or terminate a war quickly once
fighting had begun. The exception was Justin II’s aggression in 572, when
Persian difficulties with Armenians and Turks appeared to offer the
Romans an escape from having to begin annual cash payments to Persia,
the concession they fought hardest to avoid, since it could imply an acceptance
of inferior tributary status. 106 Both empires accepted that local
squabbles between clients could involve their patrons in wider conflict,
willingly or unwillingly; the peace-time ideal – enshrined, for example, in
the Fifty Years’ Peace of 561/2 – was for the military authorities on both
sides of the frontier to co-operate in the rapid elimination of such aggravations.
107 Diplomatic contacts across European frontiers were less governed
by long traditions, but had the same basic objectives of protecting
Roman interests and defusing threats without resort to the uncertainty and
expense of war. Here there was always a danger that reluctance to fight
would be interpreted as weakness, and hence merely act as an incitement to
103 Zachariah vii.6; Procop. Buildings iii.2–3; Whitby, Maurice 209–13. 104 Whitby, Maurice 70–9.
105 Whitby, Maurice 215–18; Lee (1993) 166–70; Blockley (1992) 151–63.
106 Whitby, Maurice 250–3. 107 Details in Menander fr. 6.1.
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