Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

304 11. the army, c. 420,602
length of service provided pay increases, and Anastasius was prepared to tolerate
the retention for life on military rolls of a proportion of each unit;
Justinian was criticized for abolishing this concession to military inefficiency,
but his expectation was that a combination of graduated pay plus some tax
benefits for veterans constituted sufficient provision for retirement. In
mobile units, life must have been less comfortable, but on successful campaigns
these men could benefit from booty: its attraction tended to lead to
undisciplined looting and disputes about proper apportionment. 66 For the
majority of recruits, even the bellicose Armenians, service far from home
was unpopular and might occasion dissent. The process of conscription was
disliked, and legislation against poltroons was required. On the other hand,
the right general in the right place could find volunteers through personal
connections and disbursement of money, as Belisarius in Thrace in 544,
Narses in the Balkans in 551/2, or Maurice in Cappadocia in 578. 67
Justinian is alleged to have deprived limitanei of their pay, and declassified
them from the status of soldiers, but this criticism in Procopius’ Secret
History probably misrepresents his actions. He may have instituted a system
of payment only for active service, or service away from a unit’s particular
area, whereas normal sustenance was provided by the estates attached to
each unit. The experience of an Illyrian contingent in Italy points to the
importance of estates in terms of remuneration: the men returned to the
Balkans after suffering serious arrears of pay, presumably in the belief that
they could support themselves there. 68 On the other hand, mobile troops
continued to receive annual cash payments which represented the monetary
commutations for their annona or ration allowance, if this had not been
supplied in kind, and for their uniform and arms. This was probably paid
when the troops were in winter quarters, or on the point of marshalling for
the next season’s campaign, to provide a stimulus for prompt reporting and
enthusiastic service. Although arms, horses and uniforms were not issued,
soldiers were probably expected to acquire them ultimately from the state
factories or stud farms. In spite of regulations that officers had to supervise
the proper equipping of their men, with severe penalties for failure,
allowances were not spent fully on their intended objects: when Maurice in
594 attempted to reintroduce issues in kind, the Balkan army mutinied.
There was certainly a reluctance to expose precious possessions to extra
danger, as concern for their horses was one reason why the mutinous army
in 602 refused to spend the winter north of the Danube. 69
The eastern army was underpinned by a massive administrative system
that ensured the collection and distribution of money and supplies as
66 Jones, LRE 675; Procop. Secret History 24.8; Maurice, Strat. v; Theophylact ii.4.1–3, vi.7.6–8.3.
67 Sebeos ch. 10; Digest 49.16.4.12; Procop. Wars vii.10.1–3, viii.26.5–17; John Eph. HE vi.14.
68 Procop. Secret History 24.12–14; Wars vii.11.13–16; Whitby (1995) sec. 8.
69 Jones, LRE 670–2; Maurice, Strat. 1.2; Theophylact vii.1, viii.6.2 with Whitby, Maurice 166–7.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008