Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

the era of aetius, 425,54 15
directly with Attila’s ambitions. Sometime before 449, presumably under
duress, Aetius had ceded the Pannonian province of Savia to the Huns
(Priscus fr. 7; Blockley fr. 11.1). By the same date, Attila was also enjoying
the rank of honorary magister militum of the western empire, with its attendant
salary (Priscus fr. 8; Blockley fr. 11.2, p.278.627–31). The circumstances
of these concessions are unknown. In the meantime, Attila had
concentrated on the Balkan possessions of the eastern empire, where he
won huge victories in 441/2 and (probably) 447. 34 In the late 440s, however,
Attila turned his attention westward.
Scandals within the royal family provided him with a pretext. The emperor
Valentinian’s sister, Honoria, conceived a child, we are told, as the result of
an unsuitable love affair with one Eugenius, the manager of her estates.
Eugenius was executed and Honoria placed in custody. To prevent further
scandal she was subsequently betrothed to a trustworthy senator called
Herculanus. At this point, she seems to have written to Attila offering him
half the western empire as a dowry if he would rescue and marry her. In 449
or 450, consequently, Attila made a formal demand, based on the letter, and
threatened war. What we should make of this is hard to know. The story
appears in a wide variety of sources, and the fact of Honoria’s disgrace seems
securely enough established. 35 The likelihood is, however, that Attila (having
probably exhausted the possibilities of immediate gains in the east) was in
any case planning a western campaign, or series of campaigns.
Indeed, Attila carefully prepared the ground for a major western move,
and Honoria was not his only pretext. In the summer of 449, western
ambassadors were sent to Attila to answer his charge that a Roman banker
called Silvanus was in possession of gold plate which was Attila’s by right.
The issue was trivial, but Attila threatened war if it was not settled as he
wished (Priscus fr. 8; Blockley fr. 11.2, pp.263, 265, 277). This might have
been an autocrat’s megalomania, but, given its context, I would take it as
another sign that Attila wanted to press a quarrel with the west.
Diplomatically, too, the ground was carefully prepared. In the summer of
450, outstanding issues in Attila’s relations with Constantinople were
settled on terms which the historian Priscus regarded as favourable to the
eastern empire (frr. 13–14; Blockley fr. 15.3–4). Attila’s generosity suggests
that he was keen to secure his eastern front, presumably with a western
campaign in mind. 36 At the same time, he was interfering in the west, not
least in an attempt to sow discord among its different constituent powers.
There are vague records of some kind of contact between Attila and
Geiseric, who is said to have bribed Attila to turn his armies westwards.
One of the leaders of the recently defeated bagaudae, the doctor Eudoxius,
had fled to the Huns in 448. His reception may suggest that Attila foresaw
34 I would generally follow Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 108ff. (cf. p. 11 above, n. 24). For details, see
ch. 2 (Lee), pp. 41,2, and ch. 23 (Whitby), pp. 704,12 below.
35 For further details with refs., Thompson (1996) 145–6. 36 Cf. Thompson (1996) 143.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008