Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

706 23. the balkans and greece 420,602
is also apparent from the composition of Attila’s army at the battle of the
Catalaunian Plains, where a large contingent of Goths fought for him.
There are hints about how this control was imposed. Rua’s first attested
diplomatic contact with the eastern empire came when he learnt that
certain Danubian tribes – the Amilzuri, Itimari, Tunsures, Boisci and others
– were planning to enter Roman service at a time when he was determined
to dominate them himself. 17 The process of asserting Hunnic control is
revealed in the description of the submission of the Akatziri: an error in
Roman diplomacy had insulted the leading king of this people, Kuridach,
who summoned Attila to help against his fellow kings; his colleagues submitted,
but Kuridach himself then refused an invitation to meet Attila and
so preserved his own power; the remainder of the Akatziri were placed
under the control of Attila’s eldest son, Ellac, whose installation was
entrusted to Onegesius. 18 Thereafter, the manpower of the Akatziri would
be available for use on Hunnic campaigns.
Key elements in Hunnic success against the Romans were their diplomatic
perceptiveness and a proficiency at siege warfare that distinguished
them from most of Rome’s other tribal enemies. Some aspects of Attila’s
diplomacy have already been mentioned: his control over ambassadors’
actions even at a distance and his careful distribution of rewards and opportunities.
The dénouement of the Roman attempt to subvert Edeco reveals
his tactical skill: after learning of the plot, Attila bided his time, laying a trap
for the interpreter Vigilas, the Roman go-between in the affair, so that he
was caught in possession of money whose purpose he could not explain.
This ensured maximum embarrassment for Theodosius and Chrysaphius:
Attila’s envoy, Eslas, could berate the emperor in public with little prospect
of contradiction, and hostility towards the powerful eunuch cubicularius
would be reinforced among those who now saw that his unsuccessful plotting
had endangered their lives. 19 Attila’s personal behaviour kept Roman
envoys at a psychological disadvantage: his rapid changes of mood might,
superficially, seem the irrational behaviour of a barbarian, but Priscus’
description of their impact on his fellow ambassadors suggests that Attila
knew what he was doing. The chief ambassador Maximinus, downcast at
the apparent futility of his whole journey, lay on the grass in despair while
Priscus attempted to rescue the mission by flattering Scottas, a leading Hun;
the ambassadors were then subjected to contrasting outbursts of rage and
displays of hospitality as they attempted to win favour with people of
influence at Attila’s court. Attila had established himself as diplomatic
patron, with the Roman envoys as suppliants grateful for modest tokens of
favour, for which they waited outside the royal compound like a traditional
Roman client. Ambassadors from the western empire were simultaneously
17 Priscus fr. 2.1–4. 18 Priscus fr. 11.2.241–59. 19 Priscus fr. 15.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008