Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

the maintenance of order 475
support in the east to regain control. Other substantial revolts, such as
those of Illus against Zeno and Vitalian against Anastasius, achieved
success in one particular region but could not then extend their success to
other areas. Mutinies by particular armies, in Africa in the 530s and the east
in 588–9, remained confined to their area of operations. Some of the most
serious threats to imperial control were posed by non-military members of
the court: the bankers’ plot in 562, the suspected actions of Aetherius in
560 and again in 566, or the conspiracy by a group of officials, senators and
guardsmen against the outsider Phocas in 605. 13 These reflect the belief of
civilians that they could control society and, presumably with the co-operation
of some powerful officials or members of the imperial family (as in
the planned Persarmenian coup of 548), change their master. Even the
success of Phocas’ own coup in 602 can lend support to this picture of an
essentially civilian society, since the mutinous army seems to have canvassed
other candidates as the replacement for Maurice before turning
finally to its own leader. Heraclius, too, after the deposition of Phocas,
stressed the role of the senate in his coup and in the choice of new
emperor. 14
ii. the maintenance of order
Far from undermining imperial power, military force in the east was a
crucial element in the maintenance of authority. Law and order in the
capital and other major cities had to be upheld by a combination of personal
display and the occasional deployment of violence. 15 Imperial processions
were accompanied by guards and other soldiers to magnify the
impact of the emperor’s appearance and to restore order if the spectators
turned to violence, as on Maurice’s procession to Blachernae at Candlemas
602. The extreme instance is the Nika riot of 532 when Justinian, faced by
massive popular upheaval and the desertion of parts of the imperial guard,
appealed for help to the troops stationed outside the city; these men, presumably
drawn from the units commanded by the magister militum praesentalis
which were quartered conveniently close to the capital, had to fight
their way through the city to the imperial palace, after which Justinian could
at last take the initiative and plan the destruction of the rioters. Like
Anastasius when confronted by fierce religious rioting in 512, Justinian
attempted to calm the mob by appearing in the kathisma, but, after this
failed, troops were sent to the Hippodrome to massacre those present. The
death toll was exceptional, but the mechanics of urban control were not:
13 Malalas 493.1–495.5 with Exc. de Insid. fr.49 and Theophanes 237.15–238.18; PLRE iii s.v.
Aetherius 2; Chron. Pasch. 696.6–17 with Theophanes 294.27–295.13, 297.12–298.4.
14 Theophylact viii.8.5; Nicephorus ch. 2 with Chron. Pasch. 708.4–9.
15 Lintott (1968) chs. 7–11; Nippel (1984).
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