Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

eastern survival 309
bodyguards, and imperial legislation prohibiting private citizens from carrying
arms had been directed against such personal militias. 85 The continutation
of such arrangements into the late empire is no surprise, but
whereas in the west there was a tendency towards the privatization of military
resources, in the east the private capabilities were kept accessible to
the state. 86 In part this was achieved by direct legislation against the maintenance
of private guards in cities and on estates: a law of Leo from 468
was incorporated into the Justinianic Code, while Justinian himself legislated
in 542. 87 But the inevitability of such guards could also be exploited.
In 528 Justinian had despatched senators ‘with their forces’ to defend
various eastern cities, and at the climax of the Nika riot Justinian ordered
those senators who had gathered in the palace to return to their own homes
and guard them, since the mopping up of rioters would be much easier if
they were denied access to the massive semi-fortified mansions of the
élite. 88 In Egypt some large landowners, like the Apion family, had bucellarii
who appear to have received a public salary and could be used for official
administrative purposes. 89
Within the armies individual commanders might build up large retinues
of bucellarii: Belisarius is credited with 7,000 retainers, probably an exaggeration,
but even a less distinguished figure, Valerian, could command 1,000. 90
But these men owed allegiance to the emperor as well as their commander,
and they might not follow their general through all the vicissitudes of his
career: thus some of Belisarius’ retinue stayed behind in Africa in the 530s,
and when in 544 he was moved from the eastern frontier to Italy he was not
permitted to transfer his bodyguards, as he subsequently complained to
Justinian. Prospects for better employment could also outweigh loyalty to an
individual general: thus in 550 Germanus, possible heir to the throne and well
equipped with money, could attract guards from less advantaged patrons
when preparing to march to Italy. 91 Bucellarii made a significant contribution
to the performance of eastern armies: they might be used for special missions,
or assigned to a place of danger in battle, or expected to help maintain
discipline, but it is misleading to regard this as a dangerous and inevitable
tendency towards semi-private armies. Rather, they could have a beneficial
impact on the mass of ordinary troops, by establishing higher standards of
appearance and conduct, and by dangling the rewards of preferential treatment
to stimulate others to bravery. It was for this reason that an official
manual such as the Strategikon of Maurice paid attention to their existence. 92
85 Cameron and Long (1993) 211 n. 62.
86 Whitby (1995) sec. 9; Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops 43–7.
87 CJ ix.12.10; Nov. 116; cf. also Feissel and Kaygusuz (1985). 88 Malalas 442.8–16.
89 Gascou (1976a). 90 Procop. Wars vii.1.18–20; 27.3.
91 Procop. Wars iv.10.4; vii.10.1, 12.10; 39.17.
92 Procop. Wars iii.17.1; 19.23–4; Maurice, Strat. i.2.10; 9.29–35.
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