Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

the era of aetius, 425,54 9
are recorded in different sources as suffering heavy defeats in both 436 and
437. The first occasion was explicitly at Aetius’ hands, the second at the
hands of the Huns. As we shall see, Aetius may well have organized the
Hunnic attack too (if both were not part of one and the same campaign). 13
In the Iberian peninsula, Aetius’ approach was less direct, but not, it seems,
unsuccessful. The Sueves were still harassing the Gallaecians, and Aetius
responded to requests for help by sending embassies in 433 and 438 (Hydat.
Chron. 88[98]; 91[100]; 105[113]). A panegyric of Aetius does record a military
intervention in Spain by one of his subordinates, but there is no record
of this in the writings of the Hispano-Roman chronicler Hydatius. 14
Whatever the case, the second embassy seems to have persuaded the Sueves
to make peace, not least, one presumes, because by the latter date Aetius had
already enjoyed considerable military success in Gaul.
Apart from the indigenous resources of the western empire, Aetius
drew on two outside sources of assistance in these years. The first was the
eastern empire. In 431, initially in support of Boniface (whom the east may
have backed in the struggle with Aetius), an eastern army under Aspar came
to North Africa to combat the Vandals. According to Procopius (Wars
iii.3.36), Aspar left North Africa for Constantinople after being defeated
by the Vandals, and before Boniface’s death in battle against Aetius (432).
He was still in Carthage on 1 January 434, however, by which time Aetius
was securely established in power in Italy, so that a working relationship was
probably established between Aspar and Aetius. It also seems likely that
Aspar brokered the peace treaty with the Vandals in 435, which saw them
settled in relatively poor areas of Mauretania and the Numidian coast (Fig.
2). 15 Constantinople thus continued to take an active interest in western
affairs, and, if eastern forces were unable to defeat the Vandals, they did
enough to exclude them from the richest North African provinces of
Proconsularis and Byzacena.
Second, Aetius drew very heavily on Hunnic military manpower, which
he presumably paid for in hard cash. The Huns had been his trump card in
internal imperial political disputes in both 425 and 433. 16 From the mid
430s onwards, Aetius also used them extensively in Gaul, where they were
responsible both for crushing the Armorican bagaudae and for much of
the campaign against the Visigoths. 17 The Huns also savaged the
Burgundians in 437, an event organized – according to some of our
sources, at least – by Aetius, and which preceded a resettlement of the survivors
within the Roman frontier. 18
13 Refs. as PLRE ii.24–5. Secondary accounts: Mommsen, (1901) 523; Stein (1959) 322ff.; Zecchini
(1983) ch. 9. 14 Merobaud. Pan.fr.iia 22–3;Jord.Get. 176;cf.PLRE ii.25.
15 Sources: PLRE ii.166; cf. Courtois (1955) 155–71. 16 Refs. as PLRE ii.23–4.
17 Refs. as PLRE ii.684–5.
18 Refs. as PLRE ii.523. On Aetius’ role: Stein (1959) 323; O’Flynn (1983) 89 n. 4.
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