Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

200 7. government and administration
command: the sacellarius Rusticus acted as paymaster for Justinian’s army in
Lazica, transmitted information between the emperor and his troops, and
participated in tactical debates; John the Armenian, treasurer in Belisarius’
household, was also one of his trusted commanders, and Alexander the
logothete also led an army; 163 Narses and the exarchs Smaragdus and
Eleutherius were all eunuchs with some financial experience within the
palace before their appointment to Italian commands; the future emperor
Maurice was an imperial notary before becoming count of the excubitors
and then magister militum per Orientem. The assumption of responsibility for
oversight of the limitanei in the eastern half of the empire by the magister
officiorum from 443 is analogous. 164 These appointments and rearrangements
might be seen as politically motivated, with the intention of keeping
generals under control, but administrative efficiency is an equally plausible
explanation. The empire was organized for war, and military expenditures
consumed the majority of tax revenues, so that the appointment of praetorian
prefects – for example, Apion and Calliopius for the Persian war
under Anastasius – to co-ordinate the supply of particular armies is not
surprising, since the costs of military disaster were high – for example,
Leo’s expedition against the Vandals in 468, which cost over seven million
solidi, of which the prefectural reserve provided almost half. 165 John Lydus
bitterly lamented the loss by the prefecture of its military role, 166 and may
well have wished to see it restored. The necessities of internal security,
external threats or the enforcement of tax collection might dictate the integration
of military and civilian duties, but the reversals of Justinian’s legislation
on the provincial powers indicate that there was no overall policy: 167
what mattered was what worked in a specific area at a particular time;
emperors were prepared to change their minds in the light of experience.
One interpretation of the shifting balances between military and civilian
interests, and between the different elements in the civilian administrative
structure, is to see the late Roman empire as a polycracy of competing and
overlapping powers, with the emperor as the ultimate arbitrator. 168 This
enabled the emperor, at least in the east, to avoid being dominated by his military
commanders and to ensure that no single office controlled the state:
emperors were able to intervene in administration at any level, by-passing
senior ministers to communicate directly with governors and other local
agents on even the most trivial matters. Emperors undoubtedly perceived the
benefits of a balance, and sometimes acted to eliminate individuals who had
163 Agathias, Hist. iii.2–5 (Rusticus), and cf. iv.17.2–3 (Martin); Procop. Wars iii.17 (John); Wars
vii.3.4 (Alexander); see also PLRE iii. 164 Theod. II, Nov. 24.
165 Hendy, Studies 221 for the various figures. 166 John Lydus, De Mag. iii.10–11.
167 E.g. Nov. 145.
168 Jones, LRE 341–7; Tomlin (1976); Kelly in CAH xiii.169–75. John Lydus, De Mag. ii.10; iii.22,
40 for the claim that the prefecture lost control of the fabricae to the master of offices, and had to share
control of the cursus publicus.
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