Cambridge Ancient Hi.. - Index of

the north-western provinces 505
in the late fifth and the sixth century depended not on a paid army but on
the personal followings of kings and aristocrats, as well as on military obligations.
Gone was the need for heavy taxation, and hence much of the
rationale of the late Roman state. 38
The initial responses to the absence of a Roman army differed radically
in different regions. After their rebellion against Constantine III, the
Britons appear to have asked Honorius to send troops to help defend them
against barbarian raids. The emperor, however, who was in no position to
spare soldiers in 410 or thereabouts, responded by repealing the Lex Julia
de Vi Publica: the Britons were now allowed to bear arms and defend themselves.
Even if we conclude that Zosimus was wrong to associate this act
with Britain rather than Bruttium, 39 Gildas appears to imply a similar set of
measures – and he may be thought to confirm Zosimus’ narrative. 40
Indeed, Gildas actually goes further, in saying that the Romans instructed
the Britons in various military strategies. 41
Clearly, the Britons did organize their own self-defence. Apparently in
429 they were able to defeat a combined force of Picts and Saxons, even if
they required military advice from bishop Germanus of Auxerre, supposedly
resorting to the somewhat unusual tactic of shouting ‘Hallelujah’ at
the enemy. 42 The role of Germanus here, as of Lupus and Severinus in the
later military histories of Troyes and Noricum, is difficult to assess. It may,
but does not necessarily, support the cases that Germanus and Severinus
had significant secular, and even military, careers before entering the ecclesiastical
life. 43 It may merely reflect an extraordinary extension of ecclesiastical
influence in a period when power structures were ill-defined, or it may
be no more than a literary or hagiographic topos.
Whatever the reason for the success of the Britons against the Picts and
the Saxons in 429, 44 a decade or more later a new military crisis occasioned
a further appeal to the imperial court. 45 The crisis may have been caused by
a revolt of Saxon federates, or alternatively the failure of the appeal may
have led to the employment and subsequent revolt of the federates. 46 In
either case, Britain was still working along firmly Roman lines as late as the
440s. An appeal to Aetius was certainly an appeal to re-enter the military
structures of the Roman empire, while the use of barbarian federates was
38 Wickham (1984) 19–20.
39 See, however, the dismissal of the possibility by Thompson (1977) 315 n. 43.
40 41 Gildas, De Excidio Britanniae 17–18; Wood (1984) 5. Gildas, De Excidio Britanniae 18.
42 Constantius, Vita Germani 17–18; on the possibility that much of this story is symbolic, Wood
(1984) 11–12.
43 On Germanus’ early career, Constantius, Vita Germani, ed. R. Borius, SChrét. 112 (Paris 1965) 33–5;
on Severinus’ early career, Eugippius, Vita Severini, ed. P. Régerat, SChrét. 374 (Paris 1991) 96–102.
44 On this issue see Myres (1960); Morris (1965); and especially the critical comments of
45 Liebeschuetz (1963) and (1967). Gildas, De Excidio Britanniae 20.
46 On the problems of squaring the chronology of Gildas with the Chronicle of 452, Wood (1984)
19–20.
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