15.06.2013 Views

inostrani kapital kao faktor razvoja zemalja - Ekonomski fakultet u ...

inostrani kapital kao faktor razvoja zemalja - Ekonomski fakultet u ...

inostrani kapital kao faktor razvoja zemalja - Ekonomski fakultet u ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

across Europe, within the same MNE or among related sub-suppliers 20 . ‘Nominal’<br />

(demand side) integration emerges when intra-industry trade is made of similar<br />

products, of different qualities, that travel across Europe to meet the various tastes<br />

(and income capacities) of more sophisticated consumers. The first element<br />

supports the idea that an important component of growth is still related to the<br />

capacity of CEE to remain competitive in some phases of production. The second<br />

element supports the symmetric idea that growth does not need to be export-led,<br />

and can be driven by domestic demand. The duality of this model will narrow the<br />

scope for a Developmental State the set up the right mix between ‘market<br />

discipline’ and the local ‘context’. I shall return to this in § 4.3 below.<br />

4.2 Growth functions<br />

As almost all CEE countries present a current account deficit, how do we<br />

avoid that the higher demand created by a benevolent income policy might produce<br />

an even greater deficit and expose the country to capital outflows, or capital<br />

reversal? From Figure 1, it is clear that the main avenue, for a policy, is to seek<br />

growth in itself. But which is the best possible combination between accumulation,<br />

allocation and productivity gains to this aim, given the socio-economic condition,<br />

and the political cycle of the country? The list of micro-economic policies to<br />

accelerate these function is very long. Most of these measures have been already<br />

experienced. But in setting up a proper system of incentives, discriminating<br />

between local and foreign firms, to the advantages of the latter, presents all the<br />

drawbacks that we have stressed above (Section 2). It is thus advisable, once<br />

growth has took off, to reduce the incentives to attract foreign capital to the<br />

minimum level, and let the domestic system get the most out of foreign technology<br />

and organization.<br />

4.3 Competitive discipline<br />

In § 4.1 we argued that the absence of an export-led growth (to accumulate<br />

foreign currencies and reserves via a systematic trade surplus), together with an<br />

increasing intra-industry trade across Europe, both leave a very narrow scope for a<br />

competitive discipline that represents a fair balance between ‘market forces’ and<br />

the local ‘context’. The policy mix should in fact promote market competition (as<br />

an edge for FDI), with a less uneven income policy, in order to distribute the<br />

benefits of growth without scaring foreign capital away. If successful, this policy<br />

mix would enhance the spill-over effect of FDI into the country, but only if<br />

coordination and information sharing is provided by a competent and reliable<br />

bureaucracy, which can resist, at least to some extent, lobbying and nepotism.<br />

While some FDI would probably fly away, at this point, towards cheaper labor, the<br />

20<br />

See Tiberi Vipraio and Giansoldati (2008) for a discussion on Intra-industry and Intra-firm trade<br />

during the process of ‘fragmentation’ of production cycles into the CEE.<br />

32

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!