22.06.2013 Views

Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Peter Abelard and His Contemporaries 123<br />

occur in what is proportional to that thing [Boethius, 1990, p. 39 (9-10)]. With<br />

this principle in view one may note that a ship’s pilot is not appointed by lot, and<br />

fur<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> pilot on a ship is proportional to <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ruler <strong>of</strong><br />

a city. The conclusion follows from <strong>the</strong> maximal proposition plus <strong>the</strong> two ensuing<br />

facts.<br />

The maximal proposition is <strong>the</strong> first basic conception Boethius uses to organize<br />

topical <strong>the</strong>ory; <strong>the</strong> differentia is <strong>the</strong> second. This latter is simply <strong>the</strong> feature<br />

which distinguishes one maximal proposition from ano<strong>the</strong>r, just as a differentia<br />

in general will distinguish one species from ano<strong>the</strong>r within a given genus. For (i)<br />

<strong>the</strong> differentia is “from definition”; for (ii) it is “from efficient cause”; and for<br />

(iii) it is “from proportion.” Just as <strong>the</strong> maximal proposition helps in locating a<br />

salient point about one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms out <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> argument may be developed,<br />

<strong>the</strong> differentia helps in locating <strong>the</strong> right maximal proposition. The maximal<br />

proposition is a principle which distills <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> argument; <strong>the</strong> differentia<br />

is a label which distills <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principle. 76<br />

With <strong>the</strong>se two notions Boethius purports to impose some order upon <strong>the</strong> variety<br />

<strong>of</strong> topics. These notions represent <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> departure for Abelard in his own<br />

handling <strong>of</strong> topical <strong>the</strong>ory, but, as ever, he adapts <strong>the</strong> inheritance to serve his own<br />

purposes. Two points in particular inform his approach.<br />

(i) Topical <strong>the</strong>ory is first and foremost for Abelard an ars iudicandi, a technique<br />

for judging adequacy <strong>of</strong> reasoning. This is not to say that he rejects <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

orientation <strong>of</strong> topical <strong>the</strong>ory, as an ars inveniendi; in his initial definitions, indeed,<br />

Abelard covers both conceptions <strong>of</strong> a topic. He allows that it can be defined as an<br />

“argument source” (argumenti sedes) and as “that from which a suitable argument<br />

is drawn” [Abelard, 1970, p. 253 (22-23)]. 77 But he also identifies this definition<br />

as a narrower one, and adopts what he considers <strong>the</strong> broader one as his starting<br />

point: a topic is <strong>the</strong> force <strong>of</strong> an entailment (vis inferentiae) [Abelard, 1970, p. 253<br />

(16)], or, as we might say, an inferential warrant, a consideration which ensures<br />

that <strong>the</strong>re is entailment. Of course, <strong>the</strong>se narrower and broader definitions are<br />

not in conflict, since what warrants an entailment might very well be helpful for<br />

discovering it in <strong>the</strong> first place. None<strong>the</strong>less Abelard’s program here focuses on<br />

<strong>the</strong> topic taken as an inferential warrant. Topical <strong>the</strong>ory is going to be used chiefly<br />

for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> assessment, not discovery.<br />

(ii) An interpretative tendency evident in writings from as early as <strong>the</strong> ninth<br />

century is to regard topical <strong>the</strong>ory as having a special association with hypo<strong>the</strong>tical<br />

syllogisms [Green-Pedersen, 1984, pp. 140–145]. 78 Abelard is much influenced<br />

76 As Eleonore Stump notes [Stump, 1978, p. 180, note 5] this use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term “differentia”<br />

must be distinguished from its use in denoting one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> predicables.<br />

77 Abelard associates this approach to topical material with Cicero and Themistius, and treats<br />

it in a later section <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dialectica [Abelard, 1970, pp. 414 (4) - 466 (25)]. This is briefer<br />

coverage than is given to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r approach, which runs to 261 pages in <strong>the</strong> de Rijk edition.<br />

From this fact we may infer <strong>the</strong> greater value he imputes to <strong>the</strong> broader definition.<br />

78 Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen believes that “this idea is both un-Aristotelian and un-Boethian<br />

and un-Ciceronian” [Green-Pedersen, 1987, p. 411]. However we find in [Martin, 1991, p. 290]<br />

an indication <strong>of</strong> a Boethian source; this lies in <strong>the</strong> fact that, for Boethius, maximal propositions

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!