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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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270 Terence Parsons<br />

DEFAULT: A main term <strong>of</strong> a proposition has determinate supposition<br />

unless something causes it not to. A particular affirmative sign adjoined<br />

to a term gives it determinate supposition (or, equivalently, has<br />

no effect). In ei<strong>the</strong>r case, any terms to <strong>the</strong> right and within <strong>the</strong> scope<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> denoting phrase containing <strong>the</strong> term retain <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> supposition<br />

<strong>the</strong>y already have, except that a wide distributed term becomes<br />

narrow distributive.<br />

UA: A universal affirmative sign widely distributes <strong>the</strong> term it is adjoined<br />

to and makes any o<strong>the</strong>r term to its right merely confused if it is<br />

determinate, leaving terms with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r modes unchanged.<br />

UN: A universal negative sign widely distributes <strong>the</strong> term it is adjoined<br />

to; if a term following <strong>the</strong> universal negative sign has determinate supposition<br />

it, becomes wide distributed; if <strong>the</strong> term has wide distribution<br />

it becomes merely confused; if <strong>the</strong> term has merely confused supposition<br />

it becomes narrowly distributed, and if it has narrow distribution<br />

it becomes merely confused.<br />

NEG: A negating negation has <strong>the</strong> following effect on any main term<br />

following it and in its scope:<br />

if <strong>the</strong> term is determinate it becomes wide distributed, and<br />

vice versa;<br />

if <strong>the</strong> term is merely confused it becomes narrowly distributed,<br />

and vice versa<br />

All provisions except for <strong>the</strong> first and last are consistent with <strong>the</strong> earlier rules,<br />

though <strong>the</strong>y provide more detailed information. The previous version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last<br />

rule said that if a term has distributed supposition <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> negation makes it<br />

merely confused (according to Buridan) or determinate (according to Ockham).<br />

On <strong>the</strong> new account if <strong>the</strong> term has narrow distribution it becomes merely confused,<br />

as Buridan said, and if it has wide distribution it becomes determinate, as<br />

Ockham said. Two examples we looked at earlier were <strong>the</strong>se:<br />

Not: no man runs<br />

Not: some farmer sees every donkey<br />

The new rules correctly classify ‘man’ as having determinate supposition in <strong>the</strong><br />

first proposition, and <strong>the</strong>y correctly classify ‘donkey’ as having merely confused<br />

supposition in <strong>the</strong> second proposition.<br />

9.4 Global Quantificational Import<br />

9.4.1 What are <strong>the</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> common personal supposition?<br />

This is a long-standing problem in <strong>the</strong> secondary literature: We have definitions<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modes, but what are we defining?

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