Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

Logic and Theories of Meaning . . . 377
these objects, i.e. second intentions for the logician and modes of signifying for
the grammarian. 156 There is, however, not a complete analogy between logic and
grammar. For the grammarian, the congruity of a linguistic construction depends
upon the modes of signifying of the elements of the construction (see above, p.
356). If the modes of signifying are combined in the right way, the construction
is congruous, although it may not be perfect. For the logician, however, second
intentions being combined in the right way do not make a proposition true. For a
proposition to be true there has to be a correspondence with reality. 157 Therefore,
for further analysis of a proposition, the logician has to go back to the primary
meaning of the words, i.e. the concepts and their reference.
It may be clear now that in the Modists’s view every intention draws on some
property of an object. At the same time it signifies that object. Every first intention
signifies and corresponds with a proper mode of being of an object (proprius
modus essendi rei); every second intention and mode of signifying corresponds
with a common mode of being of an object (modus essendi communis rei). 158
First as well as second intentions have their direct foundation in reality.
Radulphus Brito on second intentions
An application of modistic analyses can be found in the work of Radulphus Brito,
who taught at the Sorbonne during the years 1295-1305. 159 His works contain the
first extended and systematic treatment of intentions. His views on intentionality
had a great influence upon the intentionality debate in the early fourteenth century.
According to Radulphus and the common opinion, an intention is that by which
the intellect directs itself to an object. 160 Unlike Thomas Aquinas, Radulphus
does not distinguish between intention, act of the intellect, intelligible species and
cognition; in his view they are identical. Intentions are the result of abstraction.
So far his system seems rather straightforward, at least from an ontological point
of view. This is, however, only one side of the story, because objects can be
known in two ways and therefore there is also a twofold abstraction at the level of
apprehension.
1. In the first place objects are known (and signified) according to a proper
mode of being. In this way we conceive, on the level of apprehension, of
man, horse etc. The act of the intellect (the cognition) itself is called ‘first
abstract intention’ (prima intentio in abstracto), whereas the object that is
known is called ‘first concrete intention’ (prima intentio in concreto). The
name corresponding with the first concrete intention is ‘man’ or ‘horse’,
and the name corresponding with the first abstract intention is ‘humanity’
156Pinborg [1975a, p. 47].
157Radulphus Brito, cited by Pinborg, [1975a, p. 49]. For an extensive account of Radulphus
Brito on intentionality, see De Rijk [2005, chapter VI].
158Pinborg [1975a, p. 49].
159Pinborg [1975b, pp. 119–120].
160Radulphus Brito, soph. ‘Aliquis homo est species’, paragraph 49 [Pinborg, 1975b; 1974, p.
51].