Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

380 Ria van der Lecq
that are real and not caused by the intellect. Predicates of second intentions
(genus, species, universal) are the object of study of logicians, not, however, in
their role of real habits, but in their function of concept and likeness.
On the level of the second and third mental operations (composition and reasoning)
it is less obvious how the connection between thought and reality can be
preserved, since syllogisms and propositions etc. seem to be mental constructions.
Nevertheless, Radulphus argues that all second intentions have a relation to the
real world, because ultimately “all logical operations have to be interpreted and
verified of the things.” 169 In another version of his theory, however, Radulphus
admits that second intentions of the second and third kind are entirely caused by
the intellect. Thus, these second intentions seem to be less real than the second
intentions belonging to the level of apprehension. Since logic is mainly about this
kind of intentions, it is called a rational science rather than a real science. 170
Radulphus’ opinions were criticized and modified by Hervaeus Natalis and Peter
Aureol, but first we will turn our attention to his contemporary Duns Scotus.
Duns Scotus on intentional being
Duns Scotus (1266–1308) is the first to extend the realm of being to intentional
being (esse intentionale, esse diminutum). Because even something that does not
exist can be the object of our cognition, he concludes that that object cannot
be a real extra-mental entity. Therefore, it is a concept or intention, not to be
confused with the object of intention in reality (ratio formalis in re), upon which
it is founded when the object exists.
In the cognitive process Duns Scotus distinguishes between two acts: the sensitive
act of perceiving the extra-mental object, and the intellective act of representing
it. This intellective act produces an intelligible species. By producing
an intelligible species one is able to abstract from the particular circumstances
in which the perception occurs. The species, however, is not the object of the
intellect. It is merely an instrument, a device we need in the cognitive process. It
cannot be the object of knowledge, because it is private to one’s individual intellect,
whereas an object of knowledge is common to several people. 171 The primary
object of knowledge is the intention, or in Scotus’ words: intelligible being (esse
intelligibele). The species has real being (existence) as a quality in the intellect,
but the intelligible being has only diminished or obiective being, i.e. as an object
of knowledge. It is not only the object of a human intellect, but also of the divine
intellect. 172 This guarantees the reliability of our intellectual knowledge of the
world. In producing the intelligible species, the human intellect has access to the
realm of intelligible being. In the species the intellect sees the object with intelligi-
169 Knudsen [1982, p. 489].
170 paragraph 58-59, [ed. Pinborg, p. 147].
171 Perler [2001, p. 208].
172 Opus Oxoniense, I dist. III, q. iv. For the complex problem of the ontological status of the
intelligible being, see Perler [2002, pp. 217–230].