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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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164 Terence Parsons<br />

true. This may not accord well with ordinary speakers <strong>of</strong> Latin, but logicians<br />

insisted that this was <strong>the</strong> right way to read <strong>the</strong> proposition. This is part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

regimentation that was mentioned earlier. It may be defended in <strong>the</strong> way that any<br />

regimentation is defended, by claiming that it is useful for logical purposes, even<br />

if it does not conform well to ordinary usage.<br />

Of course, this proposal will not work unless o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong> logic are formulated<br />

with this in mind. For example, we do not want to include <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> ‘Some<br />

AisnotB∴ Some A is’. This inference, <strong>of</strong> course, is not considered valid.<br />

I said that <strong>the</strong>se proposals make for <strong>the</strong>oretical simplicity, but I didn’t say how.<br />

One simplicity is that it makes it possible to maintain <strong>the</strong>se principles:<br />

Affirmative categorical propositions are false when any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir main<br />

terms are empty.<br />

Negative categorical propositions are true when any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir main terms<br />

are empty.<br />

These principles hold for singular propositions and for <strong>the</strong> forms <strong>of</strong> categorical<br />

propositions we have discussed; <strong>the</strong>y will hold without exception, even when categorical<br />

propositions are expanded far beyond <strong>the</strong> forms that Aristotle discussed.<br />

1.5 Conversions<br />

The square <strong>of</strong> opposition deals with logical relations among propositions which<br />

have <strong>the</strong> same subject and same predicate. There are also o<strong>the</strong>r relations. If a<br />

proposition is generated from ano<strong>the</strong>r by interchanging <strong>the</strong> original subject and<br />

predicate, those propositions are candidates for <strong>the</strong> logical relation <strong>of</strong> “conversion”:<br />

7<br />

Simple conversion: A proposition is said to convert simply if it entails <strong>the</strong> result<br />

<strong>of</strong> interchanging its subject and predicate terms. Universal Negative and Particular<br />

Affirmative propositions convert simply, resulting in equivalent propositions:<br />

‘NoAisB’ converts simply to ‘No B is A’<br />

‘Some A is B’ converts simply to ‘Some B is A’.<br />

Conversion per Accidens (Accidental conversion): Whereas simple conversion<br />

produces a proposition equivalent to <strong>the</strong> original, conversion per accidens is not<br />

symmetric. A universal proposition may be converted per accidens: you interchange<br />

its subject and predicate terms and change <strong>the</strong> universal sign to a particular<br />

sign (adding a negation, if necessary, to preserve quality). This inference is<br />

not reversible.<br />

7 The conversion laws stated below were proved by Aristotle in Prior Analytics I.2. They<br />

appear (usually without pro<strong>of</strong>) in every major logic text.

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