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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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<strong>Logic</strong> and Theories <strong>of</strong> Meaning . . . 349<br />

PART I: THEORIES OF MEANING<br />

Names, concepts and things: <strong>the</strong> semantic triangle<br />

The question ’what does a word signify?’ has puzzled philosophers throughout <strong>the</strong><br />

ages. It had been a subject <strong>of</strong> discussion in <strong>the</strong> Latin west ever since Boethius<br />

gave his interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> famous passage <strong>of</strong> Peri hermeneias chapter 1, where<br />

Aristotle gives his view on <strong>the</strong> relation between language, thought and reality, or<br />

so it seems:<br />

Now spoken sounds are symbols <strong>of</strong> affections in <strong>the</strong> soul, and written<br />

marks symbols <strong>of</strong> spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not<br />

<strong>the</strong> same for all men, nei<strong>the</strong>r are spoken sounds. But what <strong>the</strong>se are<br />

in <strong>the</strong> first place signs <strong>of</strong> – affections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> soul – are <strong>the</strong> same for all;<br />

and what <strong>the</strong>se affections are likenesses <strong>of</strong> – actual things – are also<br />

<strong>the</strong> same. 6<br />

Thus, Aristotle sees written words as signs <strong>of</strong> spoken words and spoken words as<br />

signs <strong>of</strong> ‘affections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> soul’. These affections or passions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> soul are <strong>the</strong><br />

same for every human being, because <strong>the</strong>y are likenesses <strong>of</strong> extra-mental things,<br />

which are also <strong>the</strong> same for everybody. This passage <strong>of</strong> Aristotle’s has been <strong>the</strong><br />

subject <strong>of</strong> numerous commentaries, ancient as well as modern, and may well be<br />

considered as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> basic texts in <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> semantics.<br />

Boethius’ first important remark concerns <strong>the</strong> interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term ‘affections<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> soul’. 7 Boethius makes it very clear that what Aristotle meant by<br />

an ‘affection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> soul’ is a concept or understanding (intellectus) 8 . The relations<br />

between word (vox), thing (res) and concept (intellectus) are formulated as<br />

follows: <strong>the</strong> thing is conceived by <strong>the</strong> intellectus, <strong>the</strong> spoken word signifies <strong>the</strong> conceptions<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> soul. 9 Thus <strong>the</strong> relation between concept and thing is a relation <strong>of</strong><br />

conceiving, whereas <strong>the</strong> relation between spoken word and concept is characterized<br />

with <strong>the</strong> term ‘signify’ (significare or elsewhere: designare). The concept seems to<br />

be <strong>the</strong> only thing that is signified, 10 although this exclusive position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept<br />

is moderated by <strong>the</strong> statement that <strong>the</strong> intellectus is <strong>the</strong> primary significate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

noun, <strong>the</strong> thing (res) being <strong>the</strong> secondary significate. The relationships between<br />

word, thought and object, according to Boethius, can be visualized in a triangle,<br />

<strong>the</strong> so-called semantic triangle:<br />

6 Aristotle, Peri hermeneias, 16a3-8. Transl. Ackrill, in [Ackrill, 1963, p. 43].<br />

7 Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias, rec. C.<br />

Meiser, pars posterior, secunda editio [Leipzig, 1880].<br />

8 Boethius, op.cit., p. 12, line 28. Intellectus is an ambiguous term, like <strong>the</strong> German term<br />

’Begriff’ or <strong>the</strong> Dutch ’begrip’. It signifies <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> conceiving as well as <strong>the</strong> product <strong>of</strong> that<br />

act. 9Boethius, op.cit., p. 20, lines 17-20.<br />

10 Boethius, op.cit. p. 21, lines 4-5.

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