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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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<strong>Logic</strong> in <strong>the</strong> 14 th Century after Ockham 489<br />

If R(φn) = 0, <strong>the</strong>n Γn =Γn−1 ∪{¬φn}<br />

If R(φn) =?, <strong>the</strong>n Γn =Γn−1<br />

In particular, if R(φ0) = 1, <strong>the</strong>n Γ0= {φ0}. If R(φ0) =0orR(φ0) = ?, <strong>the</strong>n<br />

<strong>the</strong>re is no disputation.<br />

These rules mirror closely <strong>the</strong> clauses <strong>of</strong> Lindenbaüm’s lemma, <strong>the</strong> main idea<br />

being that propositions are gradually added to a set <strong>of</strong> propositions (which starts<br />

with one single element, <strong>the</strong> positum), while consistency is also maintained. There<br />

is a significant difference, though, in that, in <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a maximal consistent<br />

set according to this lemma, if <strong>the</strong> set Γn =Γn−1∪{φn} formed is inconsistent,<br />

<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> construction simply continues with Γn−1, i.e. <strong>the</strong> so far largest consistent<br />

set built. In <strong>the</strong> obligationes framework, however, if an inconsistent set is constructed,<br />

<strong>the</strong> procedure comes to a halt, as respondent has responded badly and<br />

thus lost <strong>the</strong> game.<br />

Outcome. O wins <strong>the</strong> game if it is recognized that Γn ⊥ ;thatis,ifR has conceded<br />

a contradictory set <strong>of</strong> propositions. R wins <strong>the</strong> game if, when <strong>the</strong> disputation<br />

is declared to be over, it is recognized that Γn ⊥ . The clause about <strong>the</strong> stipulated<br />

time concerns <strong>the</strong> feasibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> game: <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> maximal-consistent<br />

sets <strong>of</strong> propositions is not feasible within human time, <strong>the</strong>refore respondent is<br />

expected to keep consistency only during a certain time.<br />

4.2.2 Can respondent always win?<br />

The rules <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> obligational game as defined guarantee that <strong>the</strong>re always be a<br />

winning strategy for R. This is due to two facts: one is a stipulated rule <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

game and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r is a general logical fact. 64 The relevant rule <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> game<br />

is: a paradoxical positum should not be accepted. As stated by Burley himself,<br />

<strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> this clause is exactly to guarantee that R stands a chance to win.<br />

Therefore, R always starts out with a consistent set <strong>of</strong> propositions.<br />

It is a general principle <strong>of</strong> logic (and also <strong>the</strong> backbone <strong>of</strong> Lindenbaüm’s lemma)<br />

that any consistent set <strong>of</strong> propositions can always be consistently expanded with<br />

one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> propositions <strong>of</strong> a contradictory pair φnand ¬φn. 65 R starts with a consistent<br />

set <strong>of</strong> propositions (<strong>the</strong> set composed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> positum); so at each move, <strong>the</strong>re<br />

is in <strong>the</strong>ory at least one ‘correct’ way <strong>of</strong> answering, i.e. ei<strong>the</strong>r accepting or denying<br />

φn, which maintains <strong>the</strong> set <strong>of</strong> accepted and denied propositions consistent.<br />

4.2.3 Why does R not always win?<br />

But why does <strong>the</strong> game remain hard? It is a fact that R <strong>of</strong>ten makes wrong<br />

choices and is not able to keep consistency, even though to keep consistency is<br />

64 This fact has already been noticed by J. Ashworth: ‘a certain kind <strong>of</strong> consistency was<br />

guaranteed for any correctly-handled disputation’ (Ashworth 1981, 177).<br />

65 Pro<strong>of</strong>: Assume that Γ is consistent. Assume that Γ ∪{φ} is inconsistent. Thus Γ ¬φ (1).<br />

Moreover, assume that Γ ∪{¬φ} is inconsistent. Thus Γ φ (2). From (1) and (2), it follows<br />

that Γ φ&¬φ, that is, that Γ is inconsistent, which contradicts <strong>the</strong> original assumption. The<br />

principle to be proven follows by contraposition.

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