Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

54 John Marenbon
(for w) as a word for another word (as a word for ‘w’), but only where ‘w’ signifies
w, not where it merely appellates w. He gives as an example a passage in the
Categories where Aristotle says ‘every substance seems to signify this something’,
where by ‘substance’ Aristotle must have meant ‘substance word’. The implication
is that, for Anselm, on the Aristotelian reading, the question about denominatives
should not really be considered to be one about things at all. The claim that
‘Grammaticus is a quality’ must be taken as ‘The word ‘grammaticus’ signifies a
quality’ (i.e. as 22, which has already been established). Were a similar analysis,
taking the word to refer to another word, applicable to the claim ‘grammaticus is a
substance’, it would come out as ‘The word ‘grammaticus’ appellates a substance’,
that is, as 23). But Aristotle does not accept this analysis for propositions where
the relation is one of appellation, not signification, and so there is no acceptable
meaning that can be given to ‘grammaticus is a substance’.
Anselm is, therefore, presenting what he recognizes as a narrowly Aristotelian
solution to his problem, and the student in the dialogue expresses this limitation
when he sums up the reply as being ‘according to Aristotle’s treatise and according
to his followers.’ It is interesting to recognize that, earlier in the treatise, Anselm
had presented a different solution to the initial problem, which seems a little more
broadly based:
M. Tell me, when you speak to me about a grammaticus, what should I understand
you to be talking about — the word ‘grammaticus’, or the things it
signifies?
P. The things.
M. What things, then, does it signify?
P. A man and knowledge about grammar
M. So when I hear the word ‘grammaticus’, I may understand a man or knowledge
about grammar, and when I am speaking about a grammaticus, Imay
be speaking about a man or knowledge about grammar.
P. So it must be.
M. Tell me then, is a man a substance, or is it in a subject?
P. It’s a substance, not something in a subject.
M. Is knowledge about grammar a quality and in a subject?
P. It’s both.
M. Why then is it strange if someone says that grammaticus is a substance
and not in a subject with respect to a man (secundum hominem) and that
grammaticus is a quality and in a subject with respect to knowledge about
grammar (secundum grammaticam)? [Anselm, 1946, 1, 154:7-21]