Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

Peter Abelard and His Contemporaries 147
more than to assert, with respect to a given proposition, that things really are as
it says they are. This view bears obvious similarities to Abelard’s own account
of the dictum. The associated account of the true and the false is comparable to
what is now labelled as a “deflationary” approach. 111
(iv) This brings us to the remaining view, which is likely that of the Melidunenses
themselves, given that it is presented approvingly [Iwakuma, 1997, p. 21]. It has
a great deal more in common with the view of the Porretani, in ascribing to the
enuntiabile a reality outside the mind at the cost of having to articulate a metaphysically
complex view. And like the Porretani, theMelidunenses do not tend
to be metaphysically reductionist. In fact on this matter their proposal is more
metaphysically complex. The Porretani start with familiar items — objects and
properties — and envisage compositions of them to get their enuntiabile. But
Melidunenses get theirs by envisaging an item entirely distinct from the world
of objects and properties, accessible only to reason, and not to the senses, and
accordingly they confer special metaphysical status upon the enuntiabile. Indeed,
this entity falls right outside of the Aristotelian categories, and tends to be characterizable
more in terms of what it is not than what it is. It is, in particular, not
tied to particularities of linguistic formulation, so that the propositions Marcus
est albus and Tullius est candidus both give us the same enuntiabile (that Cicero
is white) [Nuchelmans, 1973, p. 172]. 112 In the end, this proposal explains how
enuntiabilia can serve as the cause of truth, but is as much in need of additional
clarification as Abelard’s proposal, and probably more in need of it than that of
the Montani and the Porretani.
However one explains it, having a notion of the dictum/enuntiabile provides
a new avenue for explaining, in the most general sense, what an argument is.
Abelard is inclined to view the argument as being nothing but the meaningful
words of which it is composed — in particular, the words constituting the premise
or premises (the conclusion being that which awaits proof, and the premise or
premises being that which supplies it). But this seemingly uncontroversial view
does actually occasion some controversy, and the dictum/enuntiabile, notwithstanding
its source in Abelard’s own writings, is appealed to on this issue as a
means of staking out different positions. All of the schools register dissent from
Abelard’s view. One of the reasons for this dissent, apparently, lies in the conventional
status of human language, every sound or written character of which could
have been established in a different signification than it was [Iwakuma, 2004, p.
319]. How then are propositions able to be stand in a relation of binding inferential
linkage? It is tempting to say that what is binding in an argument’s inferential
linkage is to be found in the dicta/enuntiabilia corresponding to its constituent
propositions.
111 [Kneepkens, 1997, pp. 85-86] discusses Parvipontanian views about the enuntiabile in connection
with a later figure from this school (Alexander Nequam). [Iwakuma, 1997, p. 21] associates
this passage from the Ars Meliduna with the Parvipontanian school based on similarities
of content.
112 See also [Martin, 1997b].