Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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274 Terence Parsons other modes can be defined in terms of ascent and descent. Here is a chart laying out the options. The notation in the chart means: D&: descent is possible to a conjunction of propositional instances D∨: descent is possible to a disjunction of instances, though not to a conjunction of propositional instances; D-: neither kind of descent is possible A&: ascent is possible from a conjunction of propositional instances, though not from a disjunction of propositional instances A∨: ascent is possible from a disjunction of propositional instances A-: neither kind of ascent is possible The definitions of the modes can then be displayed as: D& D∨ D- A- A& A∨ Determinate X X Wide Distribution X X Merely Confused X X Narrow Distribution X X [5] X X [6] X X [7] X X [8] X X [9] X X It is debatable whether any term could have mode [5]. The remaining modes are possessed by terms coupled with the following invented quantifier signs: [6] Many-or-all donkeys are spotted. [7] Some-but-not-all donkeys are spotted. [8] Every-or-no donkey is spotted. [9] Maria said that some donkey is spotted. Cases [7] and [8] each have two variants, depending on whether you decide that the term is affirmative, or negative. (If a denoting phrase is negative, then when you erase it for descent you need to insert a negation sign.) I am not aware of any writer who discussed modes of this sort. 9.6 Modes of supposition for non-main terms Our discussion so far has been confined to main terms of categorical propositions. There are non-main terms that have modes of common personal supposition according to the definitions in terms of ascent and descent. These are not specified
The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12 th through 14 th Centuries 275 by the rules from causes, and they do not correspond to any kind of global quantificational import. They are non-parasitic terms that occur inside of complex clauses, or inside of complex terms derived from relative clauses. We focus here on terms that occur within relative clauses. Can we extend our rules for the causes of modes of supposition? The rules do not presently address non-main terms. They do, however, assign modes of supposition to non-main terms which are main terms of their local clauses, relative to the local clauses, and they classify the complex terms containing them, relative to the main clause. One might hope that these pieces of information would combine to tell us the mode of supposition of the non-main term in the whole proposition. For example, we can indeed predict that if a complex term C which consists of a term modified by a relative clause has determinate supposition in a proposition P, and if a term E has determinate supposition within the clause that forms the relative clause, then E has determinate supposition in P. For example, the complex term ‘horse which some donkey sees’ has determinate supposition in: Some man sees a horse which some donkey sees And ‘donkey’ has determinate supposition in: some donkey sees Therefore, ‘donkey’ has determinate supposition in the whole proposition. (It is easy to check that one may descend to a disjunction, and ascend back from any disjunct.) This fact has more application than might be thought. For this result also applies to constructions generated from relative clauses, constructions such as adjectives or participles in attributive position. So we can tell instantly e.g. that ‘spotted’ and ‘running’ have the same modes as that of the complex term containing them in: Some spotted donkey is running Some running donkey sees a horse Anything to which our Fronting rule applies automatically falls into this category, as ‘king’ in‘Some king’s donkey is running’. An additional rule is this: if a complex term C which consists of a term modified by a relative clause has merely confused supposition in a proposition P, and if a term E has determinate supposition within the clause that forms the relative clause, then E has merely confused supposition in P. For example, the complex term ‘horse which some donkey sees’ has merely confused supposition in: Every man sees a horse which some donkey sees And ‘donkey’ has determinate supposition in: some donkey sees
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Handbook of the History of Logic: M
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4 Medieval Modal Theories and Modal
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viii Preface It remains to be seen
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x Terence Parsons University of Cal
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2 John Marenbon which was new; the
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4 John Marenbon using numbers as pr
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6 John Marenbon excusing himself fo
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8 John Marenbon translation, and he
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10 John Marenbon contemporaries, to
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12 John Marenbon tingent. One way o
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14 John Marenbon in fact exist apar
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16 John Marenbon and those using
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18 John Marenbon inherited, trying
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20 John Marenbon that is to say, th
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22 John Marenbon and other material
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24 John Marenbon manuscripts [Arist
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26 John Marenbon gin shortly after
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28 John Marenbon possibility that t
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30 John Marenbon so it does seem li
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32 John Marenbon of substance or es
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34 John Marenbon it is certainly op
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36 John Marenbon it presents itself
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38 John Marenbon 4 THE DEVELOPMENT
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40 John Marenbon For day and light
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42 John Marenbon not, then, just a
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44 John Marenbon longer perform the
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46 John Marenbon position, but to a
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48 John Marenbon of the relationshi
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50 John Marenbon mother of Christ,
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52 John Marenbon and Boethius’s v
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54 John Marenbon (for w) as a word
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56 John Marenbon and his followers
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58 John Marenbon [Aristotle, 1966]
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60 John Marenbon [Green-Pedersen, 1
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62 John Marenbon [Martin, 1991] C.
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LOGIC AT THE TURN OF THE TWELFTH CE
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Logic at the Turn of the Twelfth Ce
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84 Ian Wilks question. 2 And second
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86 Ian Wilks are these items corres
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88 Ian Wilks pertain to the form pr
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90 Ian Wilks standings of universal
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92 Ian Wilks one characteristic whi
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94 Ian Wilks understandings they ge
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96 Ian Wilks and further discussion
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98 Ian Wilks mental acts; general t
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100 Ian Wilks 1998a, p. 175]; he ca
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102 Ian Wilks fail to achieve propo
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104 Ian Wilks be something for the
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106 Ian Wilks Whatever philosophica
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108 Ian Wilks Abelard’s preferenc
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110 Ian Wilks to represent the cont
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112 Ian Wilks bial construal of the
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114 Ian Wilks nal plus the three ne
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116 Ian Wilks these persons, and no
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118 Ian Wilks tents in the first fi
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120 Ian Wilks minor which then diff
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122 Ian Wilks supply these criteria
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124 Ian Wilks by this tendency. He
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126 Ian Wilks firm as genuine entai
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128 Ian Wilks between the anteceden
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130 Ian Wilks (extensionally) “eq
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132 Ian Wilks as appropriate for to
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134 Ian Wilks conditions under whic
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136 Ian Wilks am not an animal, I a
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138 Ian Wilks [Abelard, 1970, p. 49
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140 Ian Wilks catalogue of such pat
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142 Ian Wilks itself. The relations
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144 Ian Wilks The problem with this
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146 Ian Wilks Another Abelardian th
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148 Ian Wilks This indeed is the ap
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150 Ian Wilks commonplace in the tw
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152 Ian Wilks BIBLIOGRAPHY “[Abel
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154 Ian Wilks [Green-Pedersen, 1984
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156 Ian Wilks [Rosier-Catach, 1999]
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158 Terence Parsons Medieval author
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160 Terence Parsons “Some categor
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162 Terence Parsons Every A is B co
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164 Terence Parsons true. This may
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166 Terence Parsons Figure 1 (ch 4)
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168 Terence Parsons 1.7 Quantifying
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170 Terence Parsons Every A is B Ev
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172 Terence Parsons In modern logic
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174 Terence Parsons The purpose of
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176 Terence Parsons 2.3 Extending t
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178 Terence Parsons Infinitizing ne
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180 Terence Parsons that is not a m
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182 Terence Parsons rule says that
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184 Terence Parsons The parasitic t
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186 Terence Parsons For example,
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188 Terence Parsons a term in a pro
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190 Terence Parsons signify the sam
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192 Terence Parsons this is what Oc
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194 Terence Parsons example, person
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196 Terence Parsons He continues wi
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198 Terence Parsons Since Sherwood
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200 Terence Parsons William says th
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202 Terence Parsons The term ‘thi
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204 Terence Parsons proposition (fo
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206 Terence Parsons makes no differ
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208 Terence Parsons A bishop was gr
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210 Terence Parsons a natural intui
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212 Terence Parsons In both of thes
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214 Terence Parsons The subject is
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216 Terence Parsons I believe that
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218 Terence Parsons neither should
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220 Terence Parsons 6.3 I promise y
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222 Terence Parsons 7 MODES OF SUPP
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Page 262 and 263: 254 Terence Parsons 8.5 Modes cause
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Page 288 and 289: 280 Terence Parsons [Spade, 1988] P
Page 290 and 291: 282 Henrik Lagerlund and references
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324 Henrik Lagerlund of their predi
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326 Henrik Lagerlund nowadays sort
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328 Henrik Lagerlund III. Every B i
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330 Henrik Lagerlund XIV. Every B i
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332 Henrik Lagerlund the conclusion
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334 Henrik Lagerlund (1) Differenti
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336 Henrik Lagerlund On Supposition
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338 Henrik Lagerlund On Fallacies T
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340 Henrik Lagerlund (5) ‘Both’
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342 Henrik Lagerlund substance ‘S
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344 Henrik Lagerlund [Averroes, 196
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346 Henrik Lagerlund [Patterson, 19
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348 Ria van der Lecq signification.
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350 Ria van der Lecq intellectus (c
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352 Ria van der Lecq the mind, extr
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354 Ria van der Lecq everyone, they
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356 Ria van der Lecq other words, t
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358 Ria van der Lecq term represent
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360 Ria van der Lecq nature of a sp
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362 Ria van der Lecq about men in t
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364 Ria van der Lecq The second opi
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366 Ria van der Lecq Both refer to
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368 Ria van der Lecq first mode tha
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370 Ria van der Lecq that is not th
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372 Ria van der Lecq the second hal
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374 Ria van der Lecq ‘second inte
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376 Ria van der Lecq the intellect
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378 Ria van der Lecq or ‘horsenes
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380 Ria van der Lecq that are real
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382 Ria van der Lecq it. 176 And wh
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384 Ria van der Lecq significance.
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386 Ria van der Lecq [Bacon, 1988]
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388 Ria van der Lecq [Rosier, 1983]
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390 Gyula Klima relations between l
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392 Gyula Klima regarded as attempt
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394 Gyula Klima . . . it is essenti
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396 Gyula Klima are supposed to be
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398 Gyula Klima m at t, namely, the
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400 Gyula Klima stead, representing
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402 Gyula Klima it is a substantial
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404 Gyula Klima of various ontologi
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406 Gyula Klima committed to positi
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408 Gyula Klima terance and knowing
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410 Gyula Klima does not have to me
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412 Gyula Klima namely, those to wh
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414 Gyula Klima Concepts and mental
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416 Gyula Klima signify all their s
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418 Gyula Klima provided they are n
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420 Gyula Klima So, when we say tha
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422 Gyula Klima context, the condit
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424 Gyula Klima semantic closure (i
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426 Gyula Klima a given situation i
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428 Gyula Klima This simple modific
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430 Gyula Klima in which the object
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LOGICINTHE14 th CENTURY AFTER OCKHA
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Logic in the 14 th Century after Oc
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1.2 A survey of the traditions Logi
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elsewhere, in particular in Italy.
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Some A is B (1) Every A is B (3) Lo
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it is still by and large murky terr
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MEDIEVAL MODAL THEORIES AND MODAL L
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Medieval Modal Theories and Modal L
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1.7 Essentialist Assumptions Mediev
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(10) Ex(Fx & ♦(Fx & Gx)) (11) Ex(
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(31) (p → Oq) & − L(p → q). M
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TREATMENTS OF THE PARADOXES OF SELF
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Treatments of the Paradoxes of Self
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Proof. Treatments of the Paradoxes
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIFTEENTH AND S
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Developments in the Fifteenth and S
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646 Petr Dvoˇrák 2 CARAMUEL’S L
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648 Petr Dvoˇrák ter characterist
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650 Petr Dvoˇrák ad extra as some
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652 Petr Dvoˇrák equivalences (wh
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654 Petr Dvoˇrák the two provided
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656 Petr Dvoˇrák that of arectisa
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658 Petr Dvoˇrák view of relation
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660 Petr Dvoˇrák In dealing with
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662 Petr Dvoˇrák As has been said
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664 Petr Dvoˇrák Things, which ar
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PORT ROYAL: THE STIRRINGS OF MODERN
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Port Royal: The Stirrings of Modern
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702 appellata, 416 appellation, 188
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704 Cassiodorus, 1, 2, 5, 22, 25 In
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706 determinate modality, 114 deter
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708 clear and distinct, 671 identir
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710 material essence realism, 86 Ma
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712 antiqua responsio, 440 nova res
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714 484, 552-556, 559 pseudo-Scotus
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716 narrow distributive, 267-276 pe
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718 Wyclif, J., 441, 442, 450, 452,
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