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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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The Assimilation <strong>of</strong> Aristotelian and Arabic <strong>Logic</strong> up to <strong>the</strong> Later Thirteenth Century 321<br />

Impossibly not<br />

Necessary<br />

Given <strong>the</strong>se it is not difficult to present <strong>the</strong> square <strong>of</strong> opposition for singular modal<br />

propositions. It is <strong>the</strong> following:<br />

Figure 3. The Modal Square<br />

Notice that <strong>the</strong> modal square is only for singular propositions. No one at this<br />

time presented a square <strong>of</strong> opposition for quantified modal propositions, which, <strong>of</strong><br />

course, made is completely useless for modal syllogistics. 86 A <strong>the</strong>ory for quantified<br />

modal propositions was not developed until <strong>the</strong> mid-fourteenth century. 87<br />

86 None <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> textbooks contain any discussion <strong>of</strong> modal syllgistics; except a discussion <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> modal conversion rules in Roger Bacon and Lambert <strong>of</strong> Auxerre’s books. They, however,<br />

closely follow Kilwardby’s treatment discussed above (section 4.3). Roger Bacon follows <strong>the</strong><br />

first <strong>of</strong> Kilwardby’s solutions to <strong>the</strong> conversion <strong>of</strong> necessity propositions, while Lambeert <strong>of</strong><br />

Auxerre presents both solutions. Bacon’s continued discussion <strong>of</strong> contingency propositions is<br />

ra<strong>the</strong>r confusing, since he uses contingency for what is usually calls possibility. He <strong>the</strong>refore<br />

divides contingency into that which is necessary, possible and non-necessary. It is contingency<br />

in <strong>the</strong> last sense that is usually calls contingency. He <strong>the</strong>n proceeds to make a two fold division<br />

<strong>of</strong> contingeency in this sense into contingency ad utrumlibet and contingency natum (compare<br />

Aquinas threefold distinction above). Propositions taken in none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se senses <strong>of</strong> contingency<br />

convert as necessity or possibility propositions. See Roger Bacon, Summulae Dialectices, III,<br />

199-200.<br />

87 See [Lagerlund, 2000, Chapter 5 and Appendix IX.3].

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