Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

200 Terence Parsons
William says that here
the predicate is not ascribed to the species itself, but to the species
insofar as it is in things. [Ibid]
This is because from ‘Man is the noblest of creatures’ one can infer:
this man, insofar as he is a man, is the noblest of creatures. [ibid.]
The phrase “noblest of creatures” is predicated of individual men, but reduplicatively,
that is, using the locution ‘insofar as’ orjust‘as’. So this is true:
Socrates, as [a] man, is the noblest of creatures
while this is not true:
Socrates is the noblest of creatures.
Unfortunately, none of this was worked out in any detail. So articulating a semantics
of such constructions would be an invention that goes beyond currently
available theorizing.
Instead of working out details, some other authors rejected the proposal that a
new kind of suppositing is needed here. A clear example is Ockham. He disagrees
with the appeal to simple supposition to handle these examples. He sets up the
issue by reviewing some arguments on the issue:
First, as follows: ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ is
true. I ask which kind of supposition ‘man’ has [there]. Not personal,
because each singular [of the proposition] is false. Therefore, it has
simple supposition.But if simple supposition were for an intention of
the soul, [the proposition] would be false, because an intention of the
soul is not the most worthy of creatures. Therefore, simple supposition
is not for an intention of the soul. [SL 1.66 (193)]
Ockham’s own view is:
Therefore, it has to be said that ‘man’ [in this proposition] supposits
personally, and [that the proposition] is literally false, because each [of
its] singulars is false. Nevertheless, it is true according to the meaning
of those who maintain [the proposition]. For they do not mean that
a man is nobler than any creature in general, but that he is nobler
than any creature that is not a man. And this is true among corporeal
creatures, although it is not true for intellectual substances. [ibid.
(194)]
So the answer is that the sentence means that every man is worthier than any
creature other than a man. This is followed by a typical Ockhamian qualification: