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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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338 Henrik Lagerlund<br />

On Fallacies<br />

The discussion <strong>of</strong> fallacies is by far <strong>the</strong> largest part <strong>of</strong> both Peter’s and William’s<br />

logic books. Their discussion begin by a treatment <strong>of</strong> disputations. A disputation<br />

is an activity <strong>of</strong> one person “syllogising” with ano<strong>the</strong>r to reach a conclusion.<br />

Peter explains, that five things are needed for a disputation, <strong>the</strong> originator or<br />

<strong>the</strong> opponent, a respondent, a disputed proposition, <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> disputing and <strong>the</strong><br />

instruments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputation.<br />

There are four kinds <strong>of</strong> disputations, namely didactic (doctrinal), dialectical,<br />

probative (temptative) and sophistical. The didactic disputation comes to its<br />

conclusions from premises peculiar to each discipline and not from what seems<br />

true to <strong>the</strong> respondent. The instruments <strong>of</strong> such a disputation is demonstrative<br />

syllogisms. A dialectical disputation draws contradictions from probable premises.<br />

Its instruments are <strong>the</strong> dialectical syllogisms. Probative disputations argue from<br />

what seems true to <strong>the</strong> respondent. Sophistical disputations argue from what<br />

seems probable but is not. The difference between <strong>the</strong> last two is that <strong>the</strong> first<br />

disputation from what seems true or probable to what is true, but <strong>the</strong> latter from<br />

what seems true or probable but is not.<br />

There are five kinds <strong>of</strong> sophistical disputations, which derive from <strong>the</strong> five goals<br />

<strong>of</strong> such disputations, namely refutation (redargutio), falsity (falsum), paradox (inopinabile),<br />

babbling (nugatio), and solecism (soloecismus). Refutation is <strong>the</strong> denying<br />

<strong>of</strong> what was previously granted or granting what was previously denied. Falsity<br />

occurs in <strong>the</strong> case when a proposition does not conform to reality. A paradoxical<br />

disputation is when <strong>the</strong> conclusion is contrary to <strong>the</strong> opinion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> many or <strong>the</strong><br />

wise. Babbeling is simply <strong>the</strong> repetition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same thing, and finally solecism is<br />

a disputation developing a discourse contrary to grammar.<br />

Peter divides <strong>the</strong> different fallacies into two major groups and calls <strong>the</strong> first<br />

group linguistic fallacies and <strong>the</strong> second group non-linguistic fallacies. The subdivision<br />

is <strong>the</strong> following:<br />

Linguistic fallacies <strong>of</strong>:<br />

Equivocation,<br />

Amphibology,<br />

Composition,<br />

Division,<br />

Accent,<br />

Figura dictionis (Figure <strong>of</strong> speech).<br />

Non-linguistic fallacies <strong>of</strong>:<br />

Accident,<br />

Secundum quid et simpliciter,<br />

Ignorantia elenchi,<br />

Begging <strong>the</strong> question,

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