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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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158 Terence Parsons<br />

Medieval authors did not develop an artificial symbolism, as is <strong>the</strong> custom<br />

today. 1 Instead, <strong>the</strong>y used Latin. But this was “regimented” Latin, which made<br />

<strong>the</strong> language under consideration serve many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> modern logical<br />

notation. For example, it was assumed (or perhaps stipulated) that <strong>the</strong> leftto-right<br />

ordering <strong>of</strong> signs corresponds to <strong>the</strong>ir semantic scope — so that ‘Every<br />

donkey not an animal is’ means that no donkey is an animal, and ‘Every donkey<br />

an animal not is’ means that for every donkey, <strong>the</strong>re is an animal distinct from<br />

it. This was not how ordinary users <strong>of</strong> Latin understood <strong>the</strong>ir language, but it<br />

was very useful for logical <strong>the</strong>ory. Also, because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> inflections,<br />

Latin has a fairly free word order, so that <strong>the</strong> direct object can easily precede <strong>the</strong><br />

subject in a sentence, as in ‘Every donkey some man owns’, giving it scope over<br />

<strong>the</strong> subject. Since English does not allow this, we need an artificial symbolism to<br />

permit various scope structures; medieval logicians already had this in <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />

Latin (properly, and artificially, understood).<br />

Because this is a work on supposition <strong>the</strong>ory, some important and interesting<br />

parts <strong>of</strong> medieval logic will not be addressed. Chief among <strong>the</strong>se are <strong>the</strong> Insolubles<br />

(paradoxes), Obligations (rules for specialized debate), Consequences (general <strong>the</strong>ory<br />

<strong>of</strong> inferences among arbitrary propositions), and Syncategoremata (individual<br />

studies <strong>of</strong> special words, such as ‘both’, ‘ceases’, ‘only’). These will be touched<br />

upon only as <strong>the</strong>y bear on Supposition <strong>the</strong>ory. Also, important earlier work, such<br />

as that by Abelard, will not be covered.<br />

This essay is based entirely on Latin manuscripts that have been edited and<br />

published, and it is based mostly on those works among <strong>the</strong>m that have been<br />

translated into English. Each reference to a medieval work is to book, volume,<br />

chapter, section, subsection, etc, followed by a page reference to <strong>the</strong> English translation.<br />

Unless o<strong>the</strong>rwise stated, I use <strong>the</strong> English translations provided in <strong>the</strong> texts<br />

cited.<br />

1 CORE ELEMENTS OF MEDIEVAL LOGIC<br />

Medieval <strong>Logic</strong> is built on a foundation <strong>of</strong> logical terminology, principles, and<br />

methodology that was contained in <strong>the</strong> traditional liberal arts, in particular in<br />

that part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Trivium called <strong>Logic</strong> or Dialectic. This material is mostly from <strong>the</strong><br />

writings <strong>of</strong> Aristotle, including also <strong>the</strong> Stoics and Cicero, much <strong>of</strong> it as interpreted<br />

by Boethius. 2 This section is devoted to <strong>the</strong> fundamental parts <strong>of</strong> logic that<br />

1 However, authors were happy to use schematic letters, as Aristotle did in developing his<br />

<strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> syllogism, with forms like “Some A belongs to every B”. Also, some post-medieval<br />

writers experimented with <strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> special signs whose function was to force special<br />

scope readings. For example, ‘Every man is b animal’ has <strong>the</strong> truth conditions ‘For some animal,<br />

every man is it’, because <strong>the</strong> sign ‘b’ gives <strong>the</strong> term following it wide scope. See [Ashworth, 1974,<br />

IV.II.1] for a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se special signs.<br />

2 The parts <strong>of</strong> Aristotle’s symbolic logic that were well-known around <strong>the</strong> year 1000 were his<br />

On Interpretation, Categories, and material (<strong>of</strong>ten second-hand) from <strong>the</strong> first several sections<br />

<strong>of</strong> his Prior Analytics. This subject matter was later called <strong>the</strong> “Old <strong>Logic</strong>”, to distinguish it<br />

from <strong>the</strong> “New <strong>Logic</strong>” which was based on several additional writings by Aristotle that became

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