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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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590 Mikko Yrjönsuuri<br />

suppositum [Bradwardine, internet, 47]. This step is taken in virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second<br />

part (T1.2) <strong>of</strong> Bradwardine’s first <strong>the</strong>sis, which is as follows: 17<br />

(T1) Every proposition whose extreme:<br />

(T1.1) has many supposita, signifies or means affirmation or<br />

denial for one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m, and<br />

(T1.2) if it has only one, for that.<br />

The idea <strong>of</strong> this <strong>the</strong>sis is to formulate for <strong>the</strong> context <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> truth conditions<br />

that was standard at <strong>the</strong> time, usually given in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> supposita. Propositions<br />

claim something about <strong>the</strong> things <strong>the</strong>y refer to, which is to say that <strong>the</strong>y affirm or<br />

deny something <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir supposita. Bradwardine aims at a technically satisfactory<br />

way <strong>of</strong> saying that falsehood is affirmed in ‘a’ <strong>of</strong>‘a’ itself. Thus, <strong>the</strong> subject term<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter part <strong>of</strong> (2), or ‘what is uttered by Socrates’ can be substituted by ‘a’<br />

in order to move to:<br />

(3) ‘a’ signifies that ‘a’ is false<br />

A reference to (P2) is again needed, and again it is applied in <strong>the</strong> form (P2)* as<br />

allowing one to move from ‘a’: p to ‘a’: q when p → q. Substituting <strong>the</strong> pronoun<br />

‘itself’ for ‘a’, Bradwardine achieves [Bradwardine, internet, 47]<br />

(4) ‘a’ signifies itself to be false.<br />

Now Bradwardine is almost <strong>the</strong>re, since his second <strong>the</strong>sis applies to sentences like<br />

this. It runs as follows 18 :<br />

(T2) If some proposition signifies itself not to be true or itself to be<br />

false, it signifies itself to be true and is false.<br />

Using this <strong>the</strong>sis, Bradwardine achieves for <strong>the</strong> analyzed case <strong>the</strong> crucial result.<br />

Thus [Bradwardine, internet, 47]:<br />

and<br />

(5) ‘a’ signifies itself to be true<br />

(6) ‘a’ is false.<br />

If we collect <strong>the</strong> argument toge<strong>the</strong>r, it runs as follows:<br />

Pro<strong>of</strong>.<br />

(1) ‘a’ signifies that Socrates utters a falsehood<br />

17 ”Quelibet propositio cuius extremum multa habet supposita significant sive denotat affirmationem<br />

vel negationem pro aliquo istorum, et si unicum, pro isto.” Text and translation<br />

[Bradwardine, internet, 38, 39].<br />

18 “Si aliqua propositio significet se non esse veram vel se esse falsam ipsa significant se esse<br />

veram et est falsa.” [Bradwardine, internet, 38; 39].

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