Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

The Latin Tradition of Logic to 1100 53
se signification of a word is, then, that of which it causes a thought irrespective
of context; its per aliud signification is that of which it causes a thought in a
particular context.
The reason why Anselm can assert (22) is, therefore, that the thought which the
word ‘grammaticus’ causes is not that of a man, who is a substance, who knows
grammar, since there is nothing in the word to make the listener think of a man,
as opposed to some other sort of being, who knows grammar. Yet this contention
seems mistaken. Whereas an albus might really be a white man, a white horse
or a white snail, who can be a grammaticus but a man? Anselm answers that,
although it cannot be shown that in fact there are any non-human grammatici,
there might in principle be some sort of non-human rational animal that knows
grammar [Anselm, 1946, 1, 157:30-158:5]. A genuinely contextless, and so per se,
account of the signification of ‘grammaticus’ must exclude even that very general
context which makes us think that only humans are grammatici.
Most modern analysts of De grammatico roughly equate appellation with reference.
On this reading, (23) makes the obviously true claim that the objects picked
out by the word grammaticus — that is to say, men who know grammar — are
substances. There may, however, be some anachronism in this interpretation of
appellatio. Anselm himself [Anselm, 1946, 1, 157:5-6] defines appellatio in terms
of ordinary usage: the appellative name ‘is that by which the thing is called according
to the ordinary use of speech’ (usus loquendi). The way in which we say
‘dog’ is the word in ordinary usage for dogs, ‘white thing’ for things that happen
to be white, does provide a reference-like way of linking words directly to objects
in the world. Anselm seems to be working towards an idea of reference, without
having a completely secure grasp of it. He sometimes treats signification per aliud
and appellation as if they were interchangeable [e.g. Anselm, 1946, 1, 157:1-5], a
merging that is understandable, since the per aliud signification as given by the
general context will correspond to the usus loquendi. Indeed, according to Adams
[2000, 87], the per aliud signification establishes ‘the semantic connections between
terms and things of which they are not per se significative’ — a position that does
not seem to correspond to anything that Anselm himself suggests.
Whereas (22) is straightforward, and (23) is certainly true, though a little hard
to interpret, (24) is problematic, since — on the assumption that seems to be being
made that something can belong to only one Category — it directly contradicts the
conclusion to the initial argument, (19-21), that grammaticus is a substance. This
argument is valid, and neither of the two premisses has been refuted. The minor
premiss, (20), that every man is a substance is unquestionable. The major premiss,
(19), that every grammaticus is a man, is not at all incompatible with Anselm’s
assertion that there it is possible for there to be a grammaticus who is not a man.
How, then, can Anselm be entitled to assert (24)? As Adams points out [2000, 88],
Anselm immediately adds, after (24), the point that ‘Aristotle appellates words by
the name of the things of which they are significative, and not of those of which
they are merely appellative’ [Anselm, 1946, 1, 163:26 -8]. Aristotle, then, he is
saying, sometimes uses a word ‘w’ that seems on the page to be a word for a thing