Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

Logic and Theories of Meaning . . . 383
object known and the act of knowing (habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi).
Second intentions are always rationate entities, because concrete second
intentions are things that are secondarily known, and abstract second intentions
are relations between the objects known and the act of knowing (18).
According to Hervaeus, first as well as second intentions, whether concrete or
abstract, exist obiective (i.e. as objective contents) in the intellect (17), since
everything that is known exists as an object in the intellect. Thus, when the
intellect knows a man or a horse, man or horse is said to exist objectively in
the intellect as first concrete intentions. Second intentions are founded upon first
intentions and therefore, they exist objectively in the intellect as well (23).
Intentionality exists on two levels, according to Hervaeus. 182 First concrete
intentions are founded upon the objects intellected that possess real being outside
the mind. The intentionality itself, i.e. the relationship between object intellected
and the intellect, is a first abstract intention or primary intentionality. If this
primary intentionality is itself the object intellected, it is the foundation of another
relationship to the intellect: a secondary intentionality. In this case the first
abstract intention is at the same time a second concrete intention. 183 So, either
mediately or immediately, all second intentions are founded upon a first one, which
in its turn is founded upon extra mental reality.
Hervaeus deviates from Radulphus on several points. I mention the most important
ones:
1. A first intention is not identical with the act of intellection. This is only
the case from the viewpoint of the intellect, which is not of interest for the
logician.
2. A concrete first intention is not an extra mental object taken absolutely, but
rather that object as known by the intellect.
3. First and second intentions are not founded upon different modes of being
(properties) of the object known. First intentions have their foundation in
reality, and second intentions are founded upon first intentions.
4. All intentions exist objectively in the intellect.
Thus, like Radulphus, Hervaeus turns out to be aware that our intellect makes
distinctions that are ultimately founded upon reality, but, unlike Radulphus, he
does not think that every abstract intention corresponds with a (common) mode
of being in reality.
Although the French Franciscan Peter Aureol (working in Paris ca. 1320) was a
theologian and not a logician, he nevertheless deserves a place in these paragraphs
on the intentionality debate, because he opposed the views of Radulphus Brito
and Hervaeus Natalis and is primarily known as one of Ockham’s forerunners as
a conceptualist, although recent studies have shown his originality and historical
182 De secundis intentionibus, dist. III, q. 3c, quoted by De Rijk [2005, p. 282].
183 De Rijk [2005, p. 280].